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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impacts of international remittances on child human capital 
investment, educational expenditure, and living conditions of households. Remittances 
can increase family income and reduce resource constraint problems, allowing more 
consumption and investment. On the other hand, migration which is the main driving 
force behind remittances may have a disrupting effect on family structure and may 
result in adverse outcomes. After controlling for household wealth- the main observable 
selection dimension on remitting, average estimates suggest that 6-14 years old girls 
from recipient households are more likely to attend school and 6-14 years old boys from 
recipient households are less likely to be illiterate. 15-19 years old girls and boys from 
recipient households are less likely to work as wage earners and as unpaid family 
workers, respectively. Remittances improve living conditions of households by reducing 
the probability of suffering from poverty. Lastly, recipient households spend more on 
secondary school expenses and on any sort of educational purposes.  
 
When it comes to heterogeneity of impacts of remittances which is derived by 
estimating specifications separately for households with one parent absent due to 
migration, and for households where both parents are present at home, 15-19 years old 
girls from households with both parents present at home seem to benefit the most from 
remittances. Girls from recipient households where both parents are present at home 
have higher school attendance and lower participation in wage labor. For boys from 
remittance receiving households with both parents present at home, there is no 
advantage in school attendance and wage labor implying the presence of gender 
differences in the use of remittances across households and possibly within households. 
Girls and boys from recipient households with both parents present at home, seem to be 
more literate. Households are less likely to live in poverty or extreme poverty if both of 
the parents are at home and they receive remittances. For households where both 
parents are present at home, remittances work in the direction of obtaining the favored 
outcomes, whereas for households where one of the parents is absent migration’s 
disrupting effect on family structure neutralizes positive impacts of remittances on 
outcomes of interest implying that remittances act like extra income for households 
where both parents are present at home which is free from the disrupting effect of 
migration on family structure and mimic the impacts of family income on outcomes of 
interest.  
 
v 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
Bu çalışma uluslararası para transferlerinin çocuk beşeri sermaye yatırımları, eğitim 
harcamaları, ve hanehalklarının yaşam koşulları üzerindeki etkisini araştırmaktadır. 
Para transferleri aile gelirini artırabilir ve kaynak kısıt problemlerini azaltabilir, böylece 
daha fazla tüketim ve yatırıma olanak sağlayabilir. Diğer taraftan, para transferlerinin 
arkasındaki itici güç olan göçün aile yapısı üzerindeki yıkıcı etkileri nedeniyle para 
transferleri olumsuz neticeler doğurabilir. Para transferi almanın başlıca gözlenebilir 
belirleyicisi olan hanehalkı varlıkları kontrol edildikten sonra, ortalama ölçümlerden 
çıkan sonuçlara göre, para transferi alan hanehalkı üyesi 6-14 yaş grubu kızlar okula 
gitmeye daha yatkındırlar ve para transferi alan hanehalkı üyesi 6-14 yaş grubu erkekler 
okur-yazar olmaya daha meyillidirler. Para transferi alan hanehalkı üyesi 15-19 yaş 
grubu kızların gelir getiren işlerde çalışma ihtimalleri daha azdır. Para transferi alan 
hanehalkı üyesi 15-19 yaş grubu erkeklerin ücretsiz aile işçisi olarak çalışma ihtimalleri 
daha azdır. Para transferi almak hanehalklarının yoksulluk sınırının altında yaşama 
ihtimallerini azaltarak yaşam koşullarını iyileştirici bir etki göstermektedir. Son olarak, 
para transferi alan hanehalklarının lise eğitimi ile ilgili harcamalarında ve tüm eğitim 
hizmetleri ile ilgili harcamalarında artış görülmüştür. 
 
Göçten dolayı anne babadan sadece birinin bulunduğu hanehalklarıyla, anne ve babanın 
ikisinin de evde olduğu hanehalkları için ayrı ayrı yapılan ölçümler, anne ve babanın 
birlikte yer aldığı hanehalkı üyesi 15-19 yaş grubu kızların para transferlerinden en çok 
yararlanan grup olduğunu göstermiştir. Para transferi alan anne ve babanın birlikte yer 
aldığı hanehalkı üyesi kızların okula devam etme ihtimalleri daha yüksektir ve ücret 
karşılığı işlerde çalışma ihtimalleri daha azdır. Anne ve babanın birlikte yer aldığı 
hanehalkı üyesi erkeklerde para transferi almanın okula devam ve ücret karşılığı işlerde 
çalışma ihtimallerine bir etkisi olmadığı görülmüştür. Bu da para transferlerinin 
hanehalkları arasında ve muhtemelen hanehalkları içerisindeki kullanımında cinsiyet 
ayrımcılığının gözetildiğini ima etmektedir. Para transferi alan anne ve babanın birlikte 
yer aldığı hanehalkı üyesi kız ve erkeklerin okur-yazar olma ihtimalleri daha yüksektir. 
Para transferi almak anne ve babanın birlikte yer aldığı hanehalklarının yoksulluk ve 
açlık sınırının altında yaşama ihtimallerini azaltmaktadır. Anne ve babanın birlikte yer 
aldığı hanehalkları için para transferi almak arzu edilen yönde sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. 
Halbuki anne veya babadan birinin hanehalkında yer almadığı ailelerde göçün aile 
yapısı üzerindeki yıkıcı etkileri, para transferi almanın sağladığı olumlu etkileri ortadan 
kaldırmaktadır. Bu sonuçlar da, para transferlerinin anne ve babanın birlikte yer aldığı 
hanehalklarında göçün etkilerinden arındırılmış diğer gelir kategorileri gibi bir etkiye 
sahip olduğunu göstermektedir.   
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………….iv 
ÖZET…………………………………………………………………………………….v 
LIST OF FIGURES…………………………………………………………………….vii 
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………….viii 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….1 
2. Previous Literature…………………………………………………………………..5 
3. The Case of Turkey………………………………………………………………….9 
4. Methodology………………………………………………………………………..13 
5. The Model…………………………………………………………………………..17 
6. Data and Sample Definition………………………………………………………..19 
7. Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………………….20 
8. Results……………………………………………………………………………...24 
8.1. Child School Attendance……………………………………………………....24 
8.2. Child Illiteracy…………………………………………………………………34 
8.3. Educational Expenditure………………………………………………………36 
8.4. Child Labor…………………………………………………………………….41 
8.5. Poverty…………………………………………………………………………44 
9. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………….47 
10. References………………………………………………………………………….50 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
1. Remittances vs. Other International Financial Flows to 
Developing Countries (1990-2009)……………………………………………………2 
 
viii 
 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
1. Top Remittance Receiving Countries………………………………………………..4 
2. Remittance Activity in Selected Migrant-Origin Destination Country Pairs………..5 
3. Descriptive Statistics……………………………………………………………….23 
4. 6-14 years old girls’ school attendance…………………………………………….25 
5. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Child School Attendance………………..31 
6. Child School Attendance and Presence Status of Parents in the Household……….33 
7. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Child Illiteracy…………………………..35 
8. Child Illiteracy and Presence Status of Parents in the Household………………….38 
9. Educational Expenditures…………………………………………………………..39 
10. Educational Expenditures and Presence Status of Parents in the Household………40 
11. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Child Labor……………………………...42 
12. OLS Results for Working Hours in the Last Week………………………………...44 
13. Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Poverty and Extreme Poverty…………...46 
14. Poverty and Presence Status of Parents in the Household………………………….47  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
“Remittances are household income received from abroad, resulting mainly from 
the international migration of workers” (Yang, 2011). Remittances may be in the form 
of cash or in-kind, and may be sent through formal or informal channels. Technological 
advancements and competition among financial institutions that lead to reduction in 
money transfer costs made it desirable for migrants to use dedicated money transfer 
operators such as Western Union and MoneyGram to send remittances to their home 
families (Yang, 2011). Banks which have branches present in both sending and 
receiving areas constitute another formal channel to send remittances. Those banks 
often cooperate with money transfer operators (Yang, 2011). PTT Bank of Turkey can 
be considered as an example. This institution provides remittance sending services in 
two ways; first, through its own money order transactions services and second, through 
collaboration with money transfer operator, Western Union. A variety of informal 
channels include the migrants bringing the remittance with them which bears no transfer 
costs, and using systems such as hawala and hundi in South Asia and padala in the 
Philippines which require physical presence of operators of the systems in areas in the 
host country of migrants and areas in the home country of migrants (Yang, 2011).  
When international financial flows to developing countries are considered, those 
that occur through firms, financial institutions, and governments; in other words, 
foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and official development assistance 
stand out from the rest (Yang, 2011). With the increase in international migration all 
over the world, another economic actor makes its appearance as an important 
international financial flow to developing countries-namely, remittances. The beginning 
of the 1990s witnessed remittances gaining power over other international financial 
flows to developing countries. Since the late 1990s, international migrants’ remittances 
have thrown official development assistance and portfolio investment into the shade, 
and in the beginning of the 2000s, remittances have come very close to the total amount 
of foreign direct investment flows (Yang, 2011). In 2004, the estimated value of 
workers’ remittances to developing countries was $160 billion, with $40 billion going to 
Latin America (Acosta, 2006). In 2009 and 2010, remittances to developing countries 
were $325 billion and $307 billion in nominal terms, respectively (Yang, 2011). Figure 
1 compares these four categories of international financial flows to developing countries 
from 1990 to 2009 in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
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The average annual real growth rate of remittances in the period 1999-2008; the 
decade preceding the 2008 financial crisis, is worthwhile mentioning. While foreign 
direct investment and official development assistance had average annual real growth 
rates of 11.0 percent and 5.8 percent respectively in the corresponding period, 
remittances exceeded both with an average annual real growth rate of 12.9 percent 
(Yang, 2011).  
To emphasize the role of remittances for developing countries, it will be beneficial 
to look at individual countries and the amount of remittances received and the 
corresponding remittance share of GDP.  
Figure 1 
Remittances vs. Other International Financial Flows to Developing Countries (1990–2009) 
(in billions of constant 2005 U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Notes: Data are in billions of constant (2005)  US$, in total across developing countries (low and  middle income  as          
 classified by World  Bank).  Variables displayed  are: “Net official development assistance  and official aid received (current 
 US$)”, “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)”, “Workers’ remittances  and   compensation  of  
 employees, received   (current US$)”,  and   “Portfolio   investment, excluding LCFAR (BoP, current US$)”.  
Adapted from “Migrant Remittances”, by D. Yang, 2011, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), p.130 
 
In table 1, 30 largest remittance receiving countries are presented, ranked 
accordingly by amount of remittance received (column 1) and the remittance share of 
GDP (column 2). The largest remittance receiving countries in 2010 ranked by the total 
amount of remittances received are China and India which accumulated an amount of 
$55.0 billion and $51.0 billion respectively. Mexico and Philippines received very close 
amounts of remittances with Mexico accumulating more, and they ranked 3
rd
 and 4
th
 
respectively. When it comes to remittances as a share of 2009 GDP, it is evident that 
countries with small populations but with high migrant flows changed the ranking based 
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on the amount of remittances received, entirely (Yang, 2011). Tajikistan where 
remittances account for 35 percent of GDP obtained the first rank, and this country is 
followed respectively by Tonga (28 percent), Lesotho (25 percent), Moldova (23 
percent), and Nepal (23 percent). Seven countries, where the large amounts of received 
remittances also account for a substantial share of GDP, take place in both of the lists. 
These are Philippines, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Serbia, Guatemala, Jordan, and El 
Salvador (Yang, 2011). Turkey, with its impressive migration history and huge migrant 
population, surprisingly does not take place in any of the lists. This may be due to the 
fact that those migrants and their families are settled citizens in the destination countries 
and there are no left behind family members in the home country that remittances could 
be sent to.     
Besides being large at aggregate magnitudes for developing countries, remittances 
account for a substantial fraction of the earnings of migrant workers (Yang, 2011). 
Table 2 reports the remittance share of earnings of migrant workers using data taken 
from a variety of surveys conducted in a sample of destination countries. For some 
migrant populations, the share of earnings sent as remittances is substantial. For 
Mexican migrants (surveyed by Mexican Migration Project in 2000-2009 upon return to 
Mexico) average remittance share of earnings is 31.12 percent. Migrants from El 
Salvador report remitting 37.72 percent of their earnings. Senegalese in Spain remit on 
average 49.91 percent of their earnings. For some other migrant populations, however, 
the remittance share of earnings is not that high: Moroccan migrants in France remit 
10.4 percent of earnings; Algerians in France remit 7.7 percent; Turks in Germany remit 
2.1 percent; Chinese in Australia remit 6.1 percent; Filipinos in U.S. remit 5.8 percent; 
and Cubans in U.S. remit just over 2 percent of their earnings. Average annual amount 
of remittances sent per migrant is also worth mentioning. For Mexican workers mean 
annual remittances amount $4.125, for immigrants from El Salvador the corresponding 
figure is $5314, Senegalese immigrants send on average $3304 per year. 
As international migration become widespread all over the world, remittances gain 
more and more importance due to its potential to affect both host and home countries 
and remittance receiving households. Some questions arise that need to be answered in 
order to fully grasp the meaning of remittances to a country and to a household. Firstly, 
how do remittances affect recipient households and recipient countries? Do they 
facilitate investment, or are they used to increase consumption? Do they provide 
insurance, responding countercyclically to economic conditions in migrant home areas? 
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(Yang, 2011) How do remittances take part in the calculation of net benefits of 
migration for migrant families? 
  
              Notes: Data on the dollar  value of remittances received  are from 2010, and data on remittances  
           received as a portion of GDP are from 2009. 
           Adapted from “Migrant Remittances”, by D. Yang, 2011, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), p.134 
 
This study is dealing with the micro level impacts of remittances on migrant 
families, trying to answer questions such as: are remittances used by households in 
order to invest in human capital of children? Do remittances increase households’ 
expenditures on their children’s education via its potential to relax household budget 
constraint?  Do remittances decrease child wage labor for migrant families? Besides 
these questions, the role of remittances in the calculation of net benefits of migration is 
tried to be assessed.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature 
focusing on motivations to remit and uses of remittances. Section 3 describes the case of 
Turkey in terms of migration and remittance behavior. Section 4 reviews the 
Table 1 
Top Remittance Receiving Countries
Remittances received 
(in 2010; U.S.$ billions) 
Remittances received as 
% of GDP, 2009
 
India 
 
55.0 
 
Tajikistan 
 
35 
China 51.0 Tonga 28 
Mexico 22.6 Lesotho 25 
Philippines 21.3 Moldova 23 
France 15.9 Nepal 23 
Germany 11.6 Lebanon 22 
Bangladesh 11.1 Samoa 22 
Belgium 10.4 Honduras 19 
Spain 10.2 Guyana 17 
Nigeria 10.0 El Salvador 16 
Pakistan 9.4 Jordan 16 
Poland 9.1 Kyrgyz Republic 15 
Lebanon 8.2 Haiti 15 
Egypt 7.7 Jamaica 14 
United Kingdom 7.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina 13 
Vietnam 7.2 Serbia 13 
Indonesia 7.1 Bangladesh 12 
Morocco 6.4 Philippines 12 
Russian Federation 5.6 Albania 11 
Serbia 5.6 Togo 10 
Ukraine 5.3 Nicaragua 10 
Romania 4.5 Guatemala 10 
Australia 4.3 Cape Verde 9 
Brazil 4.3 Guinea-Bissau 9 
Guatemala 4.3 Senegal 9 
Netherlands 4.1 Armenia 9 
Colombia 3.9 Grenada 9 
Jordan 3.8 Sri Lanka 8 
Portugal 3.7 Gambia 8 
El Salvador 3.6 Dominican Republic 7 
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methodology most widely used in the literature. Section 5 states the empirical model 
used in this study. Section 6 describes the data and the sample. Section 7 presents some 
descriptive statistics. Section 8 presents the results of the paper. Finally, section 9 
concludes. 
  
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Previous Literature 
 Two broad areas of literature on remittances exist: motivation to remit and uses of 
remittances. The results of the studies focusing on the former one suggest a number of 
motives to send remittances. Docquier and Rapoport (2006) come up with a model that 
explains the motivations to remit, including altruism, exchange for the services provided 
 
Table 2 
Remittance Activity in Selected Migrant Origin–Destination Country Pairs  
Sources: China–Australia: 1997 Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (Australia  LSIA), 〈http:// 
www.immi.gov.au/media/research/lsia/〉 ;  Morocco–France, Algeria–France, Senegal–France: Survey of 
Households’ Transfer of Funds to their Countries of Origin (France 2MO), Miotti, Mouhoud, and Oudinet 
(2009);  Turkey–Germany: 2000 German Socio-Economic Panel  (Germany SOEP),  〈http://www.diw.de 
/english/soep_overview/33899.html〉 ;  Morocco–Spain,  Senegal–Spain:  Netherlands  Interdisciplinary 
Demographic Institute International Migration Survey (Spain NIDI), Groenewold and Bilsborrow (2004); 
Mexico–United  States: Mexican  Migration Project  (MMP),  〈http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/〉 ; Mexico– 
United  States, China–United States, Philippines–United  States, India–United  States, Vietnam–United 
States, Cuba–United  States: New Immigrant Survey (US  NIS),  〈http://nis.princeton.edu/〉 ;  Mexico– 
United States, Cuba–United States, Dominican Republic–United  States: Pew National Survey of Latinos 
(US   Pew),   〈http://pewhispanic.org/datasets/signup.php?DatasetID=7〉 ;   El  Salvador–United   States: 
El Salvador Survey of Migrant  Families (ESSMF), Ashraf, Aycinena, Martinez,  and Yang (2011). 
Adapted from “Migrant Remittances”, by D. Yang, 2011, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), p.135 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Origin country 
 
 
Migrant 
destination 
country 
 
Average 
remittances as 
a percentage 
of earnings 
 
Average 
annual 
remittances 
($ value) 
 
 
 
 
Data source 
 
 
 
 
N 
 
China 
 
Australia 
 
6.09% 
 
$552 
 
Australia LSIA 
 
65 
Morocco France 10.37% $1,283 France  2MO 128 
Algeria France 7.67% $1,079 France  2MO 121 
Senegal France 11.23% $1,517 France  2MO 40 
Turkey Germany 2.14% $512 Germany  SOEP 334 
Ghana Italy 23.28% $2,528 Italy NIDI 497 
Morocco Spain 30.80% $2,947 Spain NIDI 461 
Senegal Spain 49.91% $3,304 Spain NIDI 399 
Mexico United States 31.12% $4,125 MMP 1268 
Mexico United States 1.91% $312 US NIS 790 
Mexico United States 10.80% $1,769 US Pew 321 
El Salvador United States 37.72% $5,314 ESSMF 877 
China United States 3.60% $568 US NIS 291 
Philippines United States 5.84% $958 US NIS 344 
India United States 1.39% $728 US NIS 526 
Vietnam United States 3.39% $297 US NIS 101 
Cuba United States 2.12% $230 US NIS 98 
Cuba United States 2.32% $398 US Pew 111 
Dominican Republic United States 9.14% $381 US Pew 95 
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to the migrant by recipients, insurance, loan repayment, and investment. Stark (1995) 
states that altruistically motivated remittances may be sent to increase consumption 
levels of recipients. On the other hand, remittances may be sent to fund productive 
investments of recipients; investments which may be on human capital or physical 
capital.  
 Another set of papers studies the uses of remittances and simply ask how 
remittances affect recipient households or countries. Studies trying to find causal 
linkages between remittances and economic performance at the country level are 
inconclusive. Faini (2007) finds a positive relationship between remittances and 
economic growth; however, others find no or a negative relationship (Chami, 
Fullenkamp, and Jajah, 2003; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). 
 Studies using micro level data are partly motivated by the desire to understand 
remittance impacts in greater detail and by the desire to achieve better causal 
identification. While reviewing studies using micro level data, it is common to observe 
a distinction made by remittance receiving households between consumption and 
investment expenditures. However, there is no widely accepted view on which one is 
desirable. Yang (2011) states that it could be optimal to use remittances on consumption 
where households suffer from low income levels; however, it could be optimal to use 
remittances on productive investments where households enjoy a sufficient or a higher 
wealth level and where productive investments would not have been achieved due to the 
budget constraints without the extra income derived from remittances.  
 Brown and Ahlburg (1999) conclude that increased income derived from 
remittances is used to allow higher levels of consumption. However, other research 
finds that migration and remittance receipts are positively correlated with some 
productive investment activities. Yang (2008) shows that international migrants’ 
favorable exchange rate shocks lead to increased entry to capital intensive enterprises 
such as transportation and manufacturing by the migrants’ origin households in 
Philippines.  
 Investing in the human capital of children is stressed in the literature as an 
important aspect of investments on the side of remittance receiving households.  A 
significant number of studies focus on the impacts of migration and remittances on 
educational attainment of children. Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that remittances 
reduce the school dropout hazard rates of 6 to 24 years old boys and girls in El Salvador 
using data from the 1997 wave of household surveys conducted in El Salvador. Acosta 
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(2006) using data from the same wave of household surveys conducted in El Salvador 
but from another year-1998, finds that girls between 11 and 17, and boys less than 15 
years of age from remittance recipient households are more likely to attend school than 
girls between 11 and 17, and boys less than 15 years of age from non-recipient 
households. He concludes that remittances help children from remittance receiving 
households to finish primary education but this benefit is no more present when it 
comes to secondary education. Yang (2008), in the case of Philippines, states that 
positive exchange rate shocks for international migrants lead to enhanced human capital 
accumulation in origin households. His results support the claim that remittances 
increase child school attendance and educational expenditure. He concludes that a 
positive exchange rate shock for international migrants is associated with an increase in 
school attendance rates of 10 to 17 years old girls. However, there is no such a causal 
relationship between positive exchange rate shocks and 10 to 17 years old boys’ school 
attendance rates. Bansak and Chezum (2009) show that, in Nepal, remittances increase 
school attendance of young children (5 to 10 years old males and females) with the 
effect being larger for males. They also show that receiving remittances do not change 
the likelihood of school attendance of old children (11 to 16 years old males and 
females). Lopez Cordova (2005), in the case of Mexico, provides evidence that 
remittances decrease illiteracy of children aged six to fourteen, and increase school 
attendance of five year old children. However, the impact on school attendance is 
insignificant for six to fourteen years old children and becomes negative for children 
between fifteen and seventeen. Instead of investigating the impacts of remittances on 
school attendance and illiteracy by accounting for gender differences, he prefers to 
examine the impacts of remittances on school attendance and illiteracy for a mixed 
sample of girls and boys. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) tried to identify a causal linkage 
between child schooling and having a household member living abroad for the case of 
Mexico. Their results imply that 10 to 15 years old girls whose mothers have less than 3 
years of schooling benefit the most from remittances in increasing their accumulated 
years of schooling. They also show that remittances increase accumulated years of 
schooling of 10 to 12 years old boys whose mothers have less than 3 years of schooling. 
Finally, there is no advantage of receiving remittances in increasing the accumulated 
years of schooling for 13 to 15 years old boys whose mothers have less than 3 years of 
schooling. In their study, years of schooling of the mother is used as a proxy for the 
wealth level of household. Hence, they argue that remittances, via relaxing the 
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household budget constraint, increase years of schooling attained for girls living in 
households with low income levels. McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) investigate the 
overall impact of migration on school attendance and the number of grade years 
completed for children aged twelve to eighteen in rural Mexico. They find evidence of a 
negative significant effect that migration has on school attendance and attainment. Their 
results show that living in a migrant household lowers the chances of boys completing 
junior high school and of boys and girls completing high school.  
    Outcomes related to child human capital accumulation is not restricted to child 
schooling only. Child labor is as important as child schooling regarding investment in 
child human capital. Labor force participation of a child reduces the time available to 
spend on education. Keeping this in mind, there is a consensus in the literature 
regarding the negative correlation between child schooling and child labor. On the other 
hand, in poor countries, while deciding on the schooling of the child, the main cost for 
the household is not the tuition, books, or uniforms but the foregone earnings of the 
child (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). Households which do not rely on their children’s 
wage labor are those that maintain a satisfactory wealth level. Therefore, increasing 
educational attainment of children is through decreasing their participation in labor 
force and this can be achieved by increasing the income level of households. As a priori 
guess, remittances by increasing household budget and relaxing liquidity constraints of 
households may serve this function. There is a large literature on how remittances affect 
child labor. Yang (2008) makes use of an exogenous variation in origin household’s 
income which results from exchange rate shocks to Filipino migrants and concludes that 
an increase in the size of the exchange rate shock is associated with a decline in total 
hours worked by 10 to 17 years old males, whereas there is not an association between 
positive exchange rate shocks and total hours worked by 10 to 17 years old girls. 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), in the case of Mexico, investigate the reason of lower 
levels of school attendance and years of schooling accumulated for migrant families’ 
children and find as an explanation doing housework for girls between ages 16 and 18 
and migrating themselves for boys at all age cohorts (12 to 15, and 16 to 18 years old). 
There is not a significant effect of having a migrant household member on 12 to 18 
years old boys’ likelihood of working as unpaid family workers or wage earners. Their 
study reveals that girls between ages 16 and 18 lose on both dimensions of human 
capital accumulation; schooling and work. In other words, 16 to 18 years old girls from 
recipient households have lower rates of school attendance and less work experience 
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compared to 16 to 18 years old girls from non-recipient households. Giannelli (2012), 
using Vietnam Living Standard Surveys for 1993 and 1998, divides remittances into 
two categories; domestic remittances and international remittances, and investigates 
their impacts on child labor and school attendance separately. Her OLS results show 
that for 1998, international remittances decrease the probability of children working for 
wage regardless of gender. Acosta (2006), in El Salvador, finds that remittances 
decrease the likelihood of both girls and boys between ages 11 and 17 working for wage 
with the impact being stronger for girls. 
 While a large fraction of the literature on the impacts of remittances is dedicated to 
human capital accumulation outcomes, some focus on the impacts on household well-
being. Adams (1998), in the case of rural Pakistan, is unable to find any significant 
impact of remittances on no-farm asset accumulations. Lopez Cordova (2005) shows 
that, in Mexico, receiving remittances decreases the chance of households suffering 
from poverty where poverty is defined as the household income being at most two times 
of the minimum wage. However, remittances do not have a significant impact on 
extreme poverty where extreme poverty is defined as the household income being 
equivalent to the minimum wage or less. It is expected not to find an alleviating impact 
of remittances on extreme poverty, since migration is a costly action and households 
suffering from extreme poverty cannot afford to migrate and send remittances back 
home. His findings signal that there is a lower boundary of income for a household to 
benefit from migration and remittances.    
 
3. The Case of Turkey 
 In the beginning of 1960s, Turkey was experiencing an unemployment rate of 10 
percent and an additional underemployment over 15 percent (Icduygu, 2009). Turkish 
government borrowed heavily from other countries and had difficulties in paying its 
import bills due to the foreign currency bottlenecks (Icduygu, 2009). At the same time, 
industrialized European countries were in serious need of manpower. In the light of 
these developments, Turkey signed bilateral agreement with Federal Republic of 
Germany in 1961 that allowed emigration of workers from Turkey to Germany (Koc 
and Onan, 2004). This was the leading step in front of the mass emigration of Turkish 
workers to European countries. The main motivations for the Turkish government in 
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promoting emigration were to reduce unemployment and to gain foreign currency 
through remittances (Icduygu, 2009).  
 With the opening of the corridor of emigration in 1961, the number of workers 
going to Europe increased dramatically and peaked at 66,000 people in 1964 (Icduygu, 
2009). Till the oil crisis of 1974, mass emigration to Europe continued. 1975 is the last 
year of observed mass emigration to Europe (Icduygu, 2009). The European countries 
were deeply affected from the oil crisis and they stopped accepting immigrant workers. 
Turkish government, then, tried to find new destination routes for its excess supply of 
labor. The new destination was set to be oil rich Arab countries. Immigrant workers at 
Arab countries were hired for a specified amount of time-till the project ends- and they 
were not allowed to bring their families with them (Icduygu, 2005). In the period of 
1975-1980, more than 75,000 contracted workers had gone to the oil-exporting 
countries (Icduygu, 2009). However, by the mid-1990s, due to the completion of large-
scale infrastructural projects most of the immigrant workers had to turn back to Turkey.  
 With the collapse of USSR in the 1990s, newly emerging countries started 
reconstruction programs and demanded labor. The mid-1990s experienced mass 
emigration to CIS countries which are former Soviet Republic countries with a total of 
65,000 emigrants (Icduygu, 2009). 
 In the early 2000s, while Turkey’s population was around 70 million, the emigrants 
had a total of 3.5 million. The largest share of emigrants was residing in Europe, a total 
of 3 million, followed by 300,000 emigrants in Australia, Canada and U.S. The next 
largest emigrant receiving region is CIS countries with a total of 150,000. Lastly, 
around 100,000 emigrants were present in Arab countries (Icduygu, 2005). International 
migrants constituted 5 percent of Turkey’s population. 
 30 to 40 percent of past emigrants permanently returned back to Turkey (Icduygu, 
2005). Besides having 5 percent of the population as current emigrants, this implies that 
a large portion of the population in Turkey has direct migration experience. In addition, 
emigrants don’t lose their contacts with the families left behind. They send letters, have 
phone calls and most importantly send remittances. A huge migration experience of this 
sort could potentially have some effects on home country’s economy. 
 The most striking impact of emigration on Turkey’s economy is through 
remittances. From 1960s to 2000s, accumulated value of remittances is $75 billion. In 
1967, remittances amounted $93 million. In 1974, the corresponding figure was $1.4 
billion and, in 1978 remittances amounted $893 million. Between 1978 and 1988 
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average annual remittances amounted to 1.5-2 billion dollars. In 1980s, remittances 
amounted 65 percent of trade deficit and 2.5 percent of GNP. During late 1980s and 
early 1990s, average annual remittance receipt was about $3 billion with a peak of $3.4 
billion in 1995. In 1990s remittances amounted one third of the trade deficit and less 
than 2 percent of GNP. However, it cannot be suggested that the decrease of remittance 
share of trade deficit and GNP is due to the decrease in annual remittance amounts. The 
decrease in the share of trade deficit and GNP could be explained with the growth of 
Turkish economy and lower contribution of remittances in the corresponding shares 
compared to the contributions from tourism, exporting and other income sources 
(Icduygu, 2005). It is an undeniable fact that remittances played a major role in 
financing the import bill of Turkey since 1960s. On the other hand, Turkey had 
experienced an unemployment rate of 16.7% in 1986. It is argued that the 
unemployment rate would have reached 23.2% in 1986, instead of 16.7%, in the 
absence of labor emigration (Barisik et al., 1990). Therefore, emigration was beneficial 
in reducing the unemployment rates in Turkey. Thus, it can be argued that a successful 
policy was run in Turkey to overcome the foreign currency bottlenecks and to reduce 
unemployment.  
 Even though Turkey has an impressive migration history and accumulates 
significant amounts of remittances each year, there are very few studies regarding the 
impacts of international migration and remittances.  
 There is a well-known migration study in Turkey; 1996 Turkish International 
Migration Survey (TIMS-96). Data was collected from 28 selected districts in 8 
provinces of Turkey in 1996 and was not representative at the national level. According 
to TIMS-96, 12 percent of households receive remittances and 80 percent of remittance 
receiving households used remittances to improve their standard of living. In TIMS-96, 
there is also evidence for regional differences in the amount of remittances received. It 
is found that households located in less developed regions are more likely to receive 
remittances than households in developed regions. Koc and Onan (2004), by using data 
from TIMS-96, find that remittances are basically used to satisfy consumption needs of 
origin households. This is a conflicting result with findings of Yang (2008) who shows 
that increased remittance income deriving from international migrants’ exchange rate 
shocks is not associated with any change in consumption of origin households in 
Philippines. Koc and Onan (2004) also show that remittance receiving households are 
better off than non-remittance recipient households. This implies that remittances have a 
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positive impact on household welfare. Day and Icduygu (1999) use data gathered from 
234 individuals in Turkey during 1992-1993 and show that return migrants and their 
close relatives have higher consumption levels than non-migrants. Keles (1985) 
conclude that remittances do not work in the direction of reducing imbalances between 
regions of Turkey, but benefit the remittance receiving households via improving their 
standards of living. Atalik and Beeley (1993) find that remittances are used for 
investment in physical capital such as acquisition of land, and cars.  
 In the case of Turkey, there is a large literature on the determinants of remittances, 
but to the best of our knowledge, impacts of remittances on different aspects of child 
human capital accumulation outcomes were not studied at all. This study will fill this 
gap and contribute to the literature by making use of micro level data to study the 
impacts of remittances on child schooling, child illiteracy, and child labor. It also tries 
to explain whether being a remittance receiving household lowers the chance of living 
in poverty or not. However, this study will add to the literature basically by 
investigating the impacts of remittances on child human capital accumulation outcomes 
separately for the cases where both parents of the child are present at home and where 
one of the parents or both are missing due to migration. The data used lets us separate 
households which receive remittances into two categories; households which receive 
remittances because of sending one of the parents abroad to work, and households 
which receive remittances from friends and relatives who are international migrants. 
The first category of households has a missing parent; however, the second category of 
households has both parents present at home. The importance of investigating the 
impacts of remittances separately for these two groups comes from the opposing effects 
of migration. As McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) states, the impact of migration on 
educational attainment is devised as a sum of three effects. First, increased remittances 
have a positive effect on educational attainment of children living in households where 
liquidity constraints are binding. Second, having a migrant parent reduces parental input 
into children’s education and increases the responsibilities of older children to take care 
of the family left behind. Older children may be required to substitute for the out of 
home or in-home responsibilities of the absent parent. Lastly, future prospect of 
migration is a significant determinant in deciding the amount of schooling desired. The 
second factor has a negative impact on educational attainment of children. In the case of 
Mexico, the third factor has a negative impact on educational attainment of children 
because the return to education is higher in Mexico than it is in U.S. Children with an 
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intention to migrate know that they will work in jobs demanding low levels of 
education; thus, reduce their desired level of schooling. Nevertheless, this impact may 
vary in sign and magnitude for different contexts. All of the studies reviewed make use 
of data where households embrace a member who is missing due to international 
migration. In such contexts, separating these different impacts is difficult. In this study, 
remittances form an exogenous variation in income for households where both parents 
are present at home and the impacts of remittances are purged from the impacts of 
migration. Furthermore, comparisons of the results between households with both 
parents present at home and households with one of the parents being absent may signal 
the impacts of migration on the outcome of interest.           
 
4. Methodology 
 Hoddinott (1994) states that migration decision is an outcome of a utility 
maximization problem solved jointly by the prospective migrant and the other 
household members. In the light of this statement, the main problem encountered in 
consistently estimating the impacts of remittances is non-random allocation of migrants 
and migrant earnings across households. The literature stresses that remittance receiving 
families are systematically different than non-remitting families in observable and non-
observable characteristics and this complicates the identification of the effects of 
remittances using standard OLS techniques. In the case of school attendance, Hanson 
and Woodruff (2003) note that migration and schooling both involve fixed costs, and in 
a context of capital market imperfections, only wealthy families can afford both 
migration and children’s schooling. So, if all facets of household wealth cannot be 
observed, there would be omitted variables correlated with both remittances and school 
attendance of children. In this example, the impact of the omitted variables on school 
attendance would be attributed to remittances, leading to upward bias in the OLS 
estimate of the coefficient of remittances. As pointed out by Acosta (2006), selection 
into being remittance recipients on characteristics like per capita income, expenditure, 
or wealth is an important problem that could bias OLS estimates of the impact of 
remittances on child human capital accumulation outcomes. This requires good controls 
for these factors or, in absence of good controls, sample selection correction techniques 
are needed in order to avoid inferring wrong impacts of remittances. 
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 There are a number of measurement issues in studies investigating the effects of 
remittances. First, the household wealth prior to migration needs to be observed in order 
to assess the economic situation of the household correctly at the time of the migration 
decision (Acosta, 2006). Controlling for per capita pre-remittance income in the 
regression equation is one of the methods used to achieve this goal. However, such info 
is not available in the data used for this study that makes it inapplicable. Second, 
ignoring the migrant’s income in calculating the non-remittance household income 
implies a zero income for the migrant if he/she had stayed at home. This assumption is 
far from being realistic, and there is no way to calculate the counterfactual household 
income without having information on migrant’s characteristics and, in our data, there is 
no information about household members who were not present at home when the 
survey was conducted. If the income of migrant households consists of just remittances, 
calculating the non-remittance income would imply zero income for those households, 
but this would not be a realistic estimation of the household wealth prior to the 
migration of the household member. Given these difficulties for assessing the economic 
situation of the household at the time of migration, some studies suggest alternative 
measures. Deaton (1997) favors using expenditure for measuring long run well-being, 
especially if households can smooth consumption. Using per capita expenditure to 
control for household wealth requires the migrant to consume the average current 
household basket if she/he had stayed at home. This assumption is less restrictive than 
the one set for non-remittance income. Nevertheless, expenditure levels are more likely 
to be affected by current remittance flows; therefore, may not be very useful in 
controlling for selection into being a remittance recipient. An alternative approach is to 
examine ownership status of different household assets, which are less likely to be 
affected from the current remittance flows (Acosta, 2006). Since, in most data sets there 
is no information on the date when the household member has migrated or when the 
household assets were acquired, the recipient families might have used the money 
transfers in order to purchase some of the observed assets, which then would not 
properly reflect the household wealth prior to migration. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
take into consideration the problems explained about selection in income, expenditure, 
or wealth, and come up with a new method to control for household resource constraints 
which is using age and education of parents as household earnings potential and home 
ownership as household wealth. According to them, these controls do not suffer from 
omitted variables problem.  
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 This study makes use of all of the four approaches to control for the household 
wealth prior to migration and compares the results. Each specification is estimated 
separately by using per capita pre-remittance income, per capita expenditure, the 
method suggested by Hanson and Woodruff (2003), and ownership status of different 
household assets as a means of household wealth control. The household assets 
controlled for include: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, 
second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine, microwave oven, washing 
machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.  
 Even after controlling for selection on observables, care must be taken because 
remittances can be correlated with unobserved determinants of the outcome of interest. 
For example, parents who care more strongly about their children may migrate just to 
earn income to cover educational expanses of their children and also devote more 
attention and nonincome resources to improve the educational outcomes of their 
children. A comparison between remittance receiving families and nonremitting 
families then overestimates the impacts of remittances on education. As a second 
example, consider labor market shocks. A negative income shock may be illustrated 
with a parent losing his job. The negative income shock which is unobserved for the 
econometrician may have induced the father to migrate and send remittances back 
home. However, there will be some time span between the departure of the father and 
the arrival of remittances to the household of origin. Due to the shortage in household 
income in this time period, children may need to work to compensate for the lost 
income of their parent and devote less time to school. In this example, the decrease in 
child schooling will be associated with receiving remittances, leading to a negative bias 
in the coefficient estimates of the impact of remittances on schooling. These two 
examples suggest that it is difficult in principle to sign the expected OLS bias. 
 To address the endogeneity of remittances some methods are introduced in the 
literature. Acosta (2006) uses propensity score matching to overcome the selection 
problem. Propensity score matching assumes that selection into being remittance 
recipients is due to observable characteristics. However, unobserved characteristics of 
households may affect their likelihood of being remittance recipients. So, this method is 
still vulnerable to the omitted variables problem.  
 Another method used in the literature to overcome endogeneity problem is fixed 
effects estimation. This method lets us to net out any observed and unobserved variation 
that is common within families or to individuals only if the omitted variable is thought 
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to be constant at the family or individual level and not expected to vary over time 
(Antman, 2012). As a counter example, think about a household experiencing a positive 
income shock. That leads the household to cover fixed costs of both migration and 
education. A researcher investigating the impacts of remittances on schooling that 
decides to use fixed effects estimation to net out any unobserved effects will falsely 
conclude that the increased education level of the child is due to receiving remittances. 
The variation in schooling outcome is partly explained by the positive income shock 
that the household has experienced, but fixed effects model cannot account for time 
varying unobserved determinants. 
 To the best of our knowledge, instrumental variables approach is the most widely 
used method to address the endogeneity of remittances. Instead of using the whole 
variation in the endogenous variable, instrumental variables approach tries to identify an 
exogenous variation in the endogenous variable and uses this exogenous variation to 
estimate the impact of the independent variable consistently. Historical migration 
patterns at the village, municipality, or state level are generally used as instruments by 
studies examining the impacts of migration or remittances. It is argued that migration 
rates are an indicator of the strength of migration networks present in the village, 
municipality, or state (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003). Access to migration networks 
helps lowering the costs of migration by giving information to the individual who has 
an intention to migrate about ways to enter to the host country, obtaining jobs, finding 
housing, attitudes towards immigrants, and living conditions in the destination area. 
Households with better access to migration networks should be more likely to send 
migrants, and hence more likely to receive remittances. The identifying assumption for 
historical migration rates to be a valid instrument is that historical migration rates 
should not have a direct impact on outcomes of interest, apart from its influence through 
current remittances. The presence of positive correlation between historical migration 
rates and remittances is justified via the cost lowering impact of migration networks on 
migration. To ensure that migration rates do not capture current economic conditions of 
the state, which may directly affect outcomes of interest, early or mid-20
th
 century 
migration rates are used. Using long lags helps ensure that there is no correlation 
between migration rates and unobserved determinants of outcomes of interest. 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), and Acosta (2006) capture the exogenous variation in 
remittances through using historical state migration rates. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
instrument for whether a household receives remittances using the interaction between 
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historical state migration rates and household characteristics. As opposed to McKenzie 
and Rapoport (2011), and Acosta (2006), Hanson and Woodruff (2003) achieved to 
obtain household level variation in estimating the impacts of remittances by using the 
interaction between historical state migration rates and household characteristics. Lopez 
Cordova (2005), in rural Mexico, instruments receiving remittances using state level 
variation in rainfall. His justification for using this instrument is that, states with high 
variation in rainfall earns agricultural income for a short time period- generally in 
summer-, instead states with low variation in rainfall earns agricultural income across 
the year. So, households in states with high variation in rainfall send household 
members abroad to work in order to earn additional income which may compensate for 
the agricultural income that could not be earned during the year. However, this 
instrument may suffer from exclusion restriction and lose its validity because there may 
be a significant correlation between variation in rainfall and income levels of states, 
where state income is an unobserved determinant of outcome of interest.  
 
5. The Model 
 Concerning children’s school attendance, at a given age some children attend the 
school and some others do not. This variation results from households’ perception of the 
return and cost of their children’s schooling. 
 Individual heterogeneity can account for some part of the variation in perceived 
returns to education. The return to education for more able children is higher and it is 
optimal to have higher education for more able children. However, child ability is not 
observed in the data. Parental education (highest level of finished schooling) is used to 
proxy for child ability. The justification of using this proxy comes from the argument 
that parents who obtained high levels of schooling may be more likely to have more 
able children for whom it is also optimal to obtain high levels of schooling. For 
households where one of the parents is missing due to migration or other reasons, the 
education level of the parent who is present at home is used. For households where both 
of the parents are present at home, the education level of the parent who obtained a 
higher level of education is used to proxy child’s ability. Besides being a proxy for child 
ability, parental education may have some other impacts on schooling outcomes of 
children. Parents’ attitudes towards education may affect the child’s perception of 
schooling. For example, parents with high education may place a high value on 
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schooling and may be more willing to invest in educating their children. In addition, 
more educated parents may be seen as positive role models on the side of the children 
while deciding on the amount of schooling to obtain.  
 The variation in households’ perceived costs of education mainly results from the 
differences in household resource constraints. In a context of imperfect credit markets, 
low income families can invest less in their children’s schooling compared to wealthier 
families. This study uses each one of per capita income, per capita expenditure, 
household assets ownership, and household earnings potential method suggested by 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) to control for household resource constraints.  
 Differences in productivity of child labor also cause variation in households’ 
perceived costs of education. In rural areas, there may be many productive activities in 
which children could participate, resulting in a decline in the amount of time devoted to 
education. Since rural communities mainly earn income from agriculture and livestock, 
and these activities demand high physical power, rural communities may place a low 
value on education. To control for these impacts a rural dummy is introduced in 
regression equations.  
 Differences in states’ investment levels on education may account for some part of 
the variation in children’s school attendance. If there are not enough schools in the 
neighborhood and the distance to the school is large, households may decide on not to 
send their children to school. Wealthier states may have more schools and may give 
children more incentive to further their study. In addition, they may invest more heavily 
in infrastructure. So, children living in wealthier states may be more likely to attend 
school. To identify state level impacts on schooling outcomes of children local 
infrastructural controls are included. Ownership of electricity, water delivery 
infrastructure, and natural gas pipeline are the subcategories of infrastructural controls.  
 Family structure is another source of variation in schooling outcomes of children. 
As McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) argue, migration disrupts family structure. 
Emigration removes the adult role models from the household, lowers the parental input 
into children’s education, and may increase the responsibilities of older children. 
Hanson and Woodruff (2003) note that children may face social and economic 
difficulties in single-parent households. There are a number of controls for family 
composition in the regression equations.  
 In the light of these explanations, I estimate equations of the form: 
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where  represents an outcome of interest (for example, child school attendance) for 
individual i in household j.  is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the 
household receives remittances and 0 otherwise.  is a vector of characteristics 
describing household resource constraints and potential returns to education for the 
child, including education of parent, whether the child has a mental or physical 
disability, household wealth, and a rural dummy.  is a vector of characteristics 
describing family structure, including whether the household head is female, whether 
the household head is married, the age category the household head belongs to, number 
of children, and size of household.  is a vector of characteristics describing the 
quality of infrastructure where household j resides.  
 
6. Data and Sample Definition 
 This paper uses data from cross-sectional household budget surveys, “Hanehalkı 
Bütçe Anketi” conducted by Turkey’s national statistical agency (Türkiye İstatistik 
Kurumu). Four years of data from the same wave of household budget surveys is pooled 
together including the years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 in order to increase variation. 
Each survey is representative at urban, rural and national levels. The surveys contain 
information on demographic characteristics including the last finished schooling level, 
current and previous employment status, earnings both in cash and in-kind, 
expenditures, and transfers received from abroad (remittances). The surveys conducted 
in 2007 and 2008 contain information on approximately 8,500 households whereas 
surveys conducted in 2009 and 2010 contain information on approximately 10,000 
households, summing up to 37,225 households in total. 
 Concerning remittances, the survey questions include the amount of remittances 
received by households in the last 12 months. As pointed out by Cox-Edwards and 
Ureta (2003), the reliability of the information given by households about the amount of 
remittances received is questionable because households pool remittances and other 
sources of income when the expenditure decisions are made. Although the cash value of 
remittances is observed, using a dummy in the estimations indicating whether the 
household receives remittances is preferred.  
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 The analysis regarding child human capital accumulation outcomes focuses on 
children between ages 6 and 19. The analyses are carried out separately for boys and 
girls. In addition, the age range is divided into two categories, ages between 6 and 14, 
and ages between 15 and 19. The particular selection of age groups is important because 
in Turkey, primary and lower secondary education is mandatory which covers the ages 
6 and 14. In principal, education services for primary and lower secondary education 
(grades 1 through 8) are provided for free by the Ministry of National Education. It is 
expected to observe high rates of school attendance for both boys and girls between 
ages 6 and 14. Therefore, remittances may not be a significant determinant of school 
attendance due to the free of charge provision of education services and its mandatory 
feature. Finding a contrary result, may have important implications. Child labor which 
is an important aspect of human capital accumulation is observed in the data from the 
beginning of age 15. Below this age, there is no information about whether a child is in 
labor force or not. Since labor force participation of a child reduces the time available 
for schooling, child labor adversely affects school attendance. Moreover, it is expected 
for children between ages 15 and 19 to be in high school and upper secondary education 
is not obligatory in Turkey. Children have the freedom to leave school and take part in 
other activities, such as labor. For this specific age group, remittances may play an 
important role in keeping children in school and out of work force, especially for 
children in low income families.  
 The sample is restricted to children who are sons or daughters of the household 
head. This helps ensure that investigation of the impacts of remittances is on children 
for whom the parents and not someone else make decisions regarding schooling.     
 
7. Descriptive Statistics 
 Transfers from abroad to any household member consist of 3 categories; in-kind 
income, pension benefit, and cash receipts from husband-wife, friends, or relatives. 
These are all reported for the last 12 months. Remittance receipts for households are 
calculated in two steps. First, for each household member the sum of amounts in each of 
the transfers from abroad categories is taken. Second, the total amounts of transfers 
from abroad to each household member are summed up to find the amount of 
remittances that the household received. Remittances are sent without any intention of 
remuneration which lets households decide where to use the additional income.  
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 Households which report receiving a nonzero value of remittances are identified as 
remittance receiving households. The ones which report receiving zero amount of 
remittance are identified as non-recipient households.  
 There are 714 households out of 37,225 that report receiving remittances. This 
corresponds to a share of 0,019. Out of every 100 households, 2 of them receive 
remittances. On the contrary to our result, TIMS-96 suggests that 12% of all households 
receive remittances, however, TIMS-96 is not representative at the national level 
whereas the data used in this study is nationally representative.  
 A substantial share of remittance receiving households consists of families where 
both parents are present at home. In the data, 482 households where both parents are 
present at home report receiving remittances. The first question that comes to mind is 
the possibility of the parents being return migrants which may imply that those 
households may suffer from the migration’s negative impacts on child human capital 
accumulation outcomes. They may receive pension benefits and this may be the 
explanation why households with both parents being at home receive remittances. 
However, only 155 of the households receive just pension benefits as remittances. In 
addition, 4 families receive both pension benefits and other kinds of transfers from 
abroad. This leads us to the conclusion that out of 482 households where both parents 
are present at home, 323 just receive remittances from friends, or relatives. They do not 
obtain transfers from abroad in the form of pension benefits. Even though previous 
migration experience is not observed for individuals-the dates and the duration of 
migration, the estimated impact of remittances will be purged from negative impacts of 
having a household member absent due to migration.  
 Out of 232 households with a missing parent, 35 households report receiving 
remittances in the form of pension benefits, plus 1 household report receiving 
remittances in the form of pensions and in other kinds of transfers from abroad. For the 
remaining 196 households, the absent parent is the source of the remittances.  
 For remittance receiving households, mean remittance shares of cash receipts, in-
kind income, and pension benefits are 61, 27, and 12 percent respectively.     
 Table 3 shows average characteristics categorized by recipient status. Non-recipient 
households are more likely to have parents with high school or above education 
compared to recipient households. Recipient household heads are older than non-
recipient household heads. Not surprisingly, recipient households have a higher 
proportion of female heads compared to non-recipient households. Non-recipient 
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households have a higher proportion of married heads compared to recipient 
households. The chances of having disabled children between ages 6 and 14 are almost 
the same for recipient households and non-recipient households. However, non-
recipient households appear to be more likely to have disabled children between ages 15 
and 19. Remittance receiving households are more likely to be located in rural areas. 
Remittance receiving families on average have slightly fewer children below age 6, 
fewer children below age 19, and slightly smaller size of household. Recipient 
households have on average higher income and higher expenditure levels. A higher 
proportion of recipient households have access to running water whereas the reverse is 
true for access to natural gas. This is plausible because a higher proportion of recipient 
households have settled in rural areas where natural gas pipeline system is not very 
common. Recipient households are more likely to own their homes.  
 Regarding the outcome variables of interest in the paper, recipient households are 
less likely to suffer from poverty and extreme poverty. Young girls (between ages 6 and 
14) and old girls (between ages 15 and 19) in remittance receiving households are more 
likely to attend school compared to young girls and old girls living in non-recipient 
households, respectively. Young boys from recipient households are less likely to attend 
school, whereas old boys from recipient households are more likely to attend school. 
Boys and girls between ages 6 and 14 in recipient households are more likely to be 
literate compared to young boys and young girls from non-recipient households, 
respectively.  
 Old girls from recipient and non-recipient households are not different in their 
likelihood of working for wage or nonwage. Recipient households appear to have a 
lower proportion of old boys who work for wage or nonwage. Old girls are less likely to 
work for wage if they are from recipient households. The reverse is true for old boys. 
Old boys are less likely to work for wage if they are from non-recipient households. 
Girls from recipient households are more likely to be unpaid family workers compared 
to girls from non-recipient households. Boys from recipient households are less likely to 
be unpaid family workers. Total working hours are slightly less for children in 
remittance receiving households. Concerning educational expenditures, recipient 
households on average seem to spend more on high school expenses whereas non-
recipient households on average appear to spend more on primary school and lower 
secondary school expenses and educational expenses at all.  
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Table 3   
Descriptive Statistics   
 Remittances 
Variables  Non-recipients Recipients 
Households (total number) 36510 714 
Max Household Education (high school or 
above) 
0.314 0.193 
Age of Household Head  47.191 50.774 
Female Head 0.125 0.301 
Married Household Head 0.888 0.846 
Has Disabled Children    
between ages 6 and 14 0.020 0.027 
between ages 15 and 19 0.023 0.005 
Rural Area 0.311 0.395 
Number of Children Under 6 0.376 0.274 
Number of Children (19 or less years old) 1.428 1.161 
Size of Household 3.896 3.468 
Log of per Capita Income 8.441 8.522 
Log of per Capita Expenditure 5.910 6.007 
Access to Running Water 0.978 0.980 
Access to Natural Gas 0.212 0.186 
Home Ownership  0.647 0.680 
School Attendance between ages 6 and 14   
Girls 
Boys 
0.933 0.969 
0.949 0.938 
School Attendance between ages 15 and 19   
Girls 0.480 0.534 
Boys 0.576 0.635 
Child İlliteracy (6-14 years old)   
Girls 0.084 0.051 
Boys 0.079 0.063 
Child Labor in General (15-19 years old)   
Girls 0.162 0.163 
Boys 0.308 0.280 
Child Labor for Wage (15-19 years old)   
Girls 0.088 0.051 
Boys 0.219 0.242 
Nonwage Child Labor (15-19 years old)   
Girls 0.074 0.112 
Boys 0.088 0.037 
Working hours (wage and nonwage work)   
Girls 7.276 5.258 
Boys 16.194 15.887 
Educational expenditures (in logs)   
on Primary and Lower Secondary 
School 
0.549 0.485 
on High School  0.436 0.599 
on all levels 0.991 0.967 
Poverty 0.776 0.760 
Extreme Poverty 0.163 0.156 
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8. Results 
8.1. Child School Attendance 
 Marginal effects after probit estimation of remittances on school attendance of girls 
between ages 6 and 14 are presented in Table 4. The dependent variable is whether a 
young girl is currently enrolled in school. In addition to remittances, the independent 
variables include indicators for the maximum household education attained by the 
parents, indicators for age group that the household head belongs to, whether the 
household head is female, whether the household head is married, whether the child has 
disability, whether the household is located in rural area, the number of children under 
six in the household, the number of children under 19 in the household, total number of 
members of the household, three year dummies, household wealth controls which are 
log of per capita pre-remittance income, log of per capita expenditure, and household 
assets ownership, lastly local infrastructure controls- access to running water and access 
to natural gas.   
 The first column of Table 4 considers only the impacts of remittances on young 
girls’ school attendance. It is evident that receiving remittances increases the likelihood 
of staying in school for young girls of recipient households. This result is consistent 
with the Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003), and Lopez Cordova (2005) findings of a 
positive relationship between remittances and school attendance. Receiving remittances 
increases the chances of young girls from recipient households attending school by 
4.4% from a base likelihood of 93.5%. This is a significant increase in school 
attendance even after taking into account the free of costs nature of education for this 
age group.  
 Column 2 introduces individual and family characteristics into the estimation. The 
significant positive impact of remittances still stays the same but the magnitude 
decreases with the introduction of new variables, indicating that some part of the 
positive impact of remittances captures other effects correlated with both remittance 
recipient status and school attendance. For example, household education is likely to be 
correlated with both remittances and schooling in a way that higher educated families 
may afford fixed costs of migration and may be more likely to send remittances, in 
addition, higher educated families may afford more schooling for their children. The 
results show that young girls with more educated parents are more likely to attend 
school compared to young girls whose parents have no education. This result is
25 
 
Table 4 6-14 years old girls'  school attendance
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
HH Receive Remittances 0.0440*** 0.0349*** 0.0346*** 0.0358*** 0.0341*** 0.0315*** 0.0337*** 0.0344***
(0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Low educated parent 0.0187* 0.0146 0.0129 0.0115 0.00974 0.0124 0.0169*
(0.0101) (0.00991) (0.00979) (0.00971) (0.00941) (0.00962) (0.00982)
Medium educated parent 0.0364*** 0.0331*** 0.0296*** 0.0272*** 0.0222*** 0.0266*** 0.0339***
(0.00721) (0.00748) (0.00791) (0.00818) (0.00846) (0.00804) (0.00725)
High educated parent 0.0355*** 0.0326*** 0.0273*** 0.0244*** 0.0171* 0.0246*** 0.0329***
(0.00676) (0.00720) (0.00829) (0.00886) (0.0102) (0.00865) (0.00702)
HH head age between 30 and 50 0.0313* 0.0292* 0.0259 0.0246 0.0231 0.0249 0.0250**
(0.0174) (0.0172) (0.0168) (0.0166) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0101)
HH head age over 50 0.00424 0.00388 0.00189 0.000683 0.00285 2.57e-05 -0.0118
(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0120)
Female HH Head 0.0117 0.0112 0.0123 0.0129 0.0122 0.0120 0.0112
(0.00874) (0.00878) (0.00858) (0.00849) (0.00832) (0.00854) (0.00861)
Married HH Head 0.00451 0.00555 0.00742 0.00724 0.00754 0.00706 0.00411
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0179)
Disabled -0.0949** -0.0928** -0.0912** -0.0918** -0.0869** -0.0903** -0.0927**
(0.0376) (0.0369) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0353) (0.0364) (0.0370)
Rural -0.0290***-0.0235***-0.0221***-0.0204***-0.0127** -0.0208***-0.0226***
(0.00501) (0.00522) (0.00523) (0.00520) (0.00556) (0.00515) (0.00531)
Number of children under 6 0.00284 0.00347 0.00358 0.00388 0.00316 0.00341 0.00408
(0.00315) (0.00315) (0.00314) (0.00314) (0.00307) (0.00310) (0.00318)
Number of children under 19 -0.00607**-0.00565* -0.00386 -0.00364 -0.00417 -0.00385 -0.00704**
(0.00298) (0.00298) (0.00304) (0.00302) (0.00291) (0.00297) (0.00299)
HH Size -0.00339 -0.00314 -0.00348 -0.00307 -0.00100 -0.00293 -0.00212
(0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00237) (0.00243) (0.00236) (0.00241)
Year 2008 -0.0834***-0.0871***-0.0874***-0.0896***-0.0869***-0.0893***-0.0864***
(0.00933) (0.00958) (0.00959) (0.00972) (0.00947) (0.00963) (0.00955)
Year 2009 -0.0165** -0.0203***-0.0214***-0.0243***-0.0235***-0.0238***-0.0209***
(0.00718) (0.00745) (0.00751) (0.00769) (0.00748) (0.00757) (0.00746)
Year 2010 -0.00438 -0.00786 -0.00981 -0.0126* -0.0112 -0.0120 -0.00804
(0.00683) (0.00709) (0.00724) (0.00748) (0.00711) (0.00732) (0.00709)
Access to Running Water 0.0412*** 0.0396*** 0.0378*** 0.0224* 0.0405*** 0.0378***
(0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0131)
Access to Natural Gas 0.00702 0.00399 0.00192 0.00436 6.19e-05 0.00712
(0.00610) (0.00637) (0.00661) (0.00856) (0.00680) (0.00605)
Log of per Capita Income 0.00799***
(0.00292)
Log of per Capita Expenditure 0.0142***
(0.00402)
Expenditure Quintile 2  0.0108**
(0.00515)
Expenditure Quintile 3 0.0221***
(0.00558)
Expenditure Quintile 4 0.0291***
(0.00603)
Expenditure Quintile 5 (Top)  0.0195**
(0.00805)
Household Earning Potential no no no no no no no yes
Household Assets Indicators no no no no no yes no no
Infrastructure Controls no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 10,729 10,729 10,729 10,729 10,729 10,729 10,729 10,729
Pseudo R-squared 0.00114 0.0813 0.0841 0.0853 0.0866 0.0952 0.0880 0.0868
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in parentheses
HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine, microwave oven,
washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
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consistent with high income generating families being more able to afford more 
schooling for their children, with it being optimal for children with higher ability 
parents to obtain more schooling, and with higher educated parents placing more value 
on education and being a positive role model for the child in deciding to continue to 
schooling. Young girls living in households where the head is between 30 and 50 have 
higher chances of attending school whereas there are no significant advantages for 
young girls from households with the head being over 50 compared to young girls 
living in households with the head being under 30. Young girls from households with 
female heads and married heads are not significantly different from young girls from 
households with male heads and single heads with respect to their probability of 
attending school. Not surprisingly, disabled young girls are less likely to attend school. 
Young girls from households located in rural areas are less likely to attend school 
compared to young girls from households located in urban areas, which may indicate 
that school attendance is lower for children where there are nearby employment options 
on the farm. Furthermore, in rural areas distance to school may play an important role 
for households to keep their girls at home. An increase in the number of children under 
19 in the household lowers the chances of young girls to attend school. This is in line 
with the idea that resource constraints do not allow parents in larger families to invest in 
education as much as they desire, resulting in a decrease of investment in the schooling 
of each child in the household. Number of children under 6 and the household size do 
not have significant impacts on school attendance. In 2008, the likelihood of a girl 
attending school, on average, is significantly less than the corresponding figure in 2007. 
This may be a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis which affected Turkey as well. 
Households may have decided to take their girls from school in order to cut educational 
expenses. The negative impact on school attendance of young girls is carried on in 
2009. However, the magnitude decreased significantly. In 2008, the probability of a 
young girl attending school decreases from a base likelihood of 94.8% by 8.34%. In 
2009, the probability of a girl attending school decreases from the same base likelihood 
of 94.8% by 1.65%. In 2010, the negative impact seems to have disappeared. 
 Column 3 introduces infrastructural controls to the previous specification. Young 
girls living in households with access to running water are more likely to attend school, 
which may indicate that municipalities that invest more in infrastructure also do more to 
promote education; maybe give children more incentive to attend school or build more 
classrooms and schools, and in this way, decrease the time spent on getting to school by 
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children who had suffered before from insufficient school facilities in their 
neighborhoods. Remittances and the other independent variables are not affected 
significantly, both in their signs and in their magnitudes, by the introduction of 
infrastructural controls.    
 One important missing control is household wealth. Household wealth is most 
likely positively correlated with remittance receiving status and school attendance, if, as 
suggested in Table 3, remittance receiving households are located on the right tail of the 
income distribution. If this is the case, failing to properly control for household wealth 
may lead to upward biased estimates of the impact of remittances on school attendance. 
Columns 4 to 8 introduce different methods to control for household wealth. In column 
4, log of per capita pre-remittance income is controlled to identify the impact of 
household wealth. The coefficient estimate of log per capita pre-remittance income 
indicates that a 1% increase in income, leads to a 0.7% increase in the likelihood of a 
young girl attending school. This is consistent with richer families being able to afford 
more schooling for their children. The point estimate of remittances decreased from 
0.044 to 0.0358 with the introduction of household wealth control implying that failing 
to control for household wealth results in upward biased estimates of remittances. Other 
coefficient estimates are very similar to those in column 3 except for variables 
household head being between 30 and 50, and number of children under 19 in the 
household. The signs of the variables are preserved but they lose their significance with 
the introduction of household wealth control.  
 There is a problem in using log of per capita pre-remittance income to control for 
household wealth. Without having information on the migrant parent about his previous 
employment and earnings level, using log of per capita pre-remittance income would 
falsely identify the income level of the household prior to migration. Especially, for 
households for which remittances constitute a substantial share of their income, using 
pre-remittance income would lead us to conclude that low income families are more 
likely to send migrants whereas it is known that migration incurs fixed costs and 
wealthier families are more likely to afford these costs and send migrants.  
 Log of per capita expenditure is used as a means of household wealth control in 
column 5. The impact of remittances is still significantly positive but slightly less in 
magnitude compared to the impact of remittances in column 4. The results show that 
1% increase in per capita expenditure increases young girls’ chances of attending school 
by approximately 1.5%. Using log of per capita expenditure implies a stronger impact 
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of household wealth and a slightly smaller impact of remittances on young girls’ school 
attendance. This may be due to the fact that log of per capita expenditure provides a 
better control for household wealth, or being affected from current remittance flows 
(being correlated with remittances), log of per capita expenditure captures some part of 
the positive impact of remittances on schooling. All of the coefficient estimates are 
similar to those in column 4, except for year 2010. The insignificant negative impact of 
year 2010 dummy becomes significant at 10% level. 
 In column 6, household assets indicators are used to control for household wealth. 
The main argument behind using ownership status of different household assets as an 
indicator of the economic situation of the household prior to receiving remittances is 
that acquisition of the set of household assets is less likely to be affected by current 
remittance flows and is more likely to be the  outcome of past savings. The household 
assets included in the regression specification are: number of rooms per adult 
equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine, 
microwave oven, washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer 
house, land, and shop. Receiving remittances is associated with a 3.15 percent increase 
in the probability of young girls from recipient households attending school. All other 
coefficient estimates are very similar to those in column 5. Young girls from households 
with more educated parents have higher chances of attending school compared to young 
girls from households with parents having no education. For a young girl, having 
disability and living in a rural area is as associated with a significant decrease in her 
likelihood of attending school. Year 2008 and the year following 2008 have significant 
negative impacts on the school attendance of young girls most probably due to the 
adverse effects of 2008 financial crisis on households’ well-being. Young girls living in 
municipalities which spend more on infrastructure seem to have higher chances of 
attending school.  
 In column 7, controlling for household wealth is achieved by dividing households 
into 5 categories after ranking the households from poorest to richest with respect to 
their corresponding amounts of log of per capita expenditures. The results suggest that 
as households step on a higher stair on the ladder of expenditure quintile, young girls 
from these households have an increased chance of attending school. The remaining 
coefficient estimates are very similar to the ones from the specification with household 
wealth being controlled by means of log of per capita expenditure. Using expenditure 
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quintiles as means of household wealth controls embrace the same problems with the 
method of log of per capita expenditure since the former is created from the latter.  
 Lastly, column 8 introduces the method suggested by Hanson and Woodruff (2003) 
to control for household wealth. In their paper, age and education of parents and home 
ownership status of household head are used as means of household wealth control. 
Their purpose in implementing this method was to avoid from simultaneity of family 
income and child schooling. For example, a negative income shock to a parent (parent 
losing his job) reduces family income and induces children to work outside home to 
compensate for the lost income. Therefore, children have less time devoted to schooling 
and their chances of attending school decreases. Introducing age and education of 
parents and home ownership status as controls for household wealth solves the potential 
endogeneity problem of family income. However, there is a concern about the power of 
these controls in indicating the household wealth. In our data, the correlation between 
earnings level of a household and the maximum education attained by one of the parents 
in the household is only 0.34 which is not a significant correlation for education to 
proxy well enough the household wealth prior to migration. Some of the coefficient 
estimates are significantly different than corresponding estimates obtained from 
specifications where other household wealth controls are run into work. From columns 
4 to 7, being in a household with parents having low levels of education has no 
advantage for young girls. However, in column 8, young girls from households with 
low educated parents have a significantly higher probability to attend school compared 
to young girls from households with parents having no education. Neither being in a 
household with a head between ages 30 and 50 nor being in a household with a head 
over 50 has a significantly different impact on school attendance of young girls than 
being in a household with a head under 30 in columns 4 to 7. In column 8, young girls 
from households with a head between ages 30 and 50 are more likely to attend school 
compared to girls from households with a head under 30. Number of children under 19 
in a household does not play an important role in keeping children at school in columns 
4 to 7, but in column 8, each additional child lowers the probability of young girls’ 
school attendance by 0.7%.  
 To sum up, there is a positive correlation between receiving remittances and school 
attendance of young girls. This is consistent with the idea that remittances help relax 
household budget constraints or remittances are sent deliberately to fund child human 
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capital investments in households of origin and allow children to complete more 
schooling. 
 In the light of these arguments, from hereafter ownership status of specific 
household assets is going to be fixed as a means of household wealth control.  
       Table 5 presents marginal effects for the four samples of children. Except for young 
girls, receiving remittances is not associated with a significant change in the likelihood 
of school attendance of children. Although the direction of the impact of remittances is 
still towards increasing the chances of children’s school attendance, the coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. This may be due to the negative impacts of migration on 
school attendance resulting mainly from the absence of the migrant parent neutralizing 
the positive impacts of remittances resulting from its power to increase family income, 
or may be due to the unobserved determinants of schooling downwardly biasing the 
coefficient estimates of remittances. Acosta (2006) finds a positive impact of receiving 
remittances on school attendance of children between ages 11 and 17. After 
instrumental variables approach is used to control for unobserved heterogeneity, the 
magnitude of the impact increases implying that the direction of the bias in the 
estimates of remittances is downward. Hanson and Woodruff (2003) has a similar 
conclusion for accumulated schooling of girls between ages 10 to 15, and boys between 
ages 10 to 12. After instrumenting for whether a household has a migrant member, the 
positive OLS estimates increased significantly, again implying a downward bias in the 
OLS estimates caused by the correlation between unobserved determinants of schooling 
and having a migrant household member.  
 Having a high educated parent is associated with an increase in the probability of 
school attendance of children regardless of age and gender. There are no significant 
advantages for girls from households with a head between 30 and 50, and from 
households with a head over 50 compared to girls from households with a head under 
30. However, young boys (6-14 years old) benefit from living in households with heads 
over 30 compared to young boys from households with heads being under 30. This may 
imply significant differences in perceptions of schooling and in attitudes towards 
children between households with relatively younger and older heads. Older household 
heads are likely to be more experienced in child care, and are likely to know more about 
returns and costs of education compared to younger household heads, and thus, may be 
tempted to invest more in the schooling of their young boys. On the other hand, children 
between ages 6 and 14 are obliged to attend school. Older household heads may be
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more knowledgeable compared to relatively younger household heads about the 
consequences of taking their children from school when they are required to attend 
school which may be the reason of observed higher school attendance rate for young 
boys living in households with older heads. For boys between ages 15 and 19 living in 
households with older heads results in a significant decline in the probability of 
attending school. Children between ages 15 and 19 are supposed to attend high school 
and high school attendance is not compulsory in Turkey. Children are free in deciding 
to continue schooling or to leave school in order to take part in other activities such as 
6 to 14 15 to 19 6 to 14 15 to 19
HH Receive Remittances 0.0315*** 0.0678 0.00463 0.0669
(0.0114) (0.0529) (0.0121) (0.0517)
Low educated parent 0.00974 0.141*** 0.00447 0.0365
(0.00941) (0.0317) (0.00716) (0.0291)
Medium educated parent 0.0222*** 0.242*** 0.00701 0.180***
(0.00846) (0.0333) (0.00760) (0.0302)
High educated parent 0.0171* 0.263*** 0.0208*** 0.189***
(0.0102) (0.0359) (0.00649) (0.0333)
HH head age between 30 and 50 0.0231 -0.159 0.0253* -0.869***
(0.0161) (0.249) (0.0135) (0.0131)
HH head age over 50 0.00285 -0.257 0.0157** -0.947***
(0.0136) (0.240) (0.00778) (0.00827)
Female HH Head 0.0122 0.0631** -0.00590 -0.0101
(0.00832) (0.0303) (0.00825) (0.0320)
Married HH Head 0.00754 0.0589 -0.00792 0.0573
(0.0184) (0.0401) (0.0112) (0.0405)
Disabled -0.0869** -0.195*** -0.142*** -0.355***
(0.0353) (0.0571) (0.0312) (0.0411)
Rural -0.0127** -0.0787*** -0.00616 -0.0516***
(0.00556) (0.0186) (0.00449) (0.0177)
Number of children under 6 0.00316 -0.00401 0.00558** 0.0128
(0.00307) (0.0148) (0.00270) (0.0144)
Number of children under 19 -0.00417 -0.0138 -0.000855 0.00561
(0.00291) (0.00915) (0.00252) (0.00857)
HH Size -0.00100 -0.0196** -0.00299 -0.0179**
(0.00243) (0.00816) (0.00215) (0.00745)
Year 2008 -0.0869*** 0.0618*** -0.0726*** -0.0241
(0.00947) (0.0202) (0.00846) (0.0197)
Year 2009 -0.0235*** 0.0545*** -0.00141 0.0446**
(0.00748) (0.0195) (0.00567) (0.0188)
Year 2010 -0.0112 0.102*** -0.000386 0.0813***
(0.00711) (0.0197) (0.00568) (0.0182)
Observations 10,729 5,884 10,922 5,976
Pseudo R-squared 0.0952 0.138 0.0997 0.0867
computer, camera, dishwashing machine,microwave oven, washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
Girls Boys
Table 5: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Child School Attendance
VARIABLES
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis
Infrastructural controls are included but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home,
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working. Older households heads with being more knowledgeable about the return and 
costs of education, may allow their children to leave school if they are convinced that 
the returns to extra  schooling will be less than the costs of extra schooling. Old girls 
from households with female heads are more likely to attend school. Having disability 
and being a member of a household located in rural area is associated with a decrease in 
the likelihood of attending school for all four samples of children. Girls and boys 
between ages 15 and 19 living in larger households (with respect to number of 
household members) are less likely to attend school compared to old boys and old girls 
living in smaller households. This is consistent with the idea that the increase in the size 
of household is not due to the increase in adult members who earn wages but due to the 
increase in the number of members who do not earn wages (children, grandparents and 
relatives), and in larger families resource constraints may force parents to invest less in 
education of each child, and may require older children to work for wage and contribute 
to the family income. The year dummies seem to benefit older boys and girls with 
respect to school attendance rates which may result from increased efforts of the 
Ministry of National Education and the education society in general to keep children in 
school. Alternatively, year dummies may be capturing some other impacts changing 
from year to year that are important determinants of children’s school attendance. 
 The results suggest that remittances do increase the probability of school attendance 
for young girls, but the significant positive impact do not seem to hold for the other 
samples of children. If, as suggested before, migration’s negative impacts resulting 
mainly from the absence of the migrant parent, the lack of parental input into children’s 
education, the increased responsibilities of children, and the children’s future migration 
prospects neutralizes the positive impacts of remittances, then it is expected to observe 
an increase in the probability of children attending school for households with both 
parents being present at home which receive remittances from other sources. Children 
from these households are supposed to be unaffected by migration’s negative impacts 
on school attendance since none of these households have current migrant parents.  
 Table 6 presents marginal effects for two different samples. The first one includes 
children between ages 6 and 19 from households where one of the parents is not present 
at home due to migration or other purposes. The second sample includes children 
between ages 6 and 19 from households where both of the parents are present at home. 
This specification lets us to compare the impacts of remittances on school attendance 
for these two groups. In the first four columns, the impact of remittances is not purged
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from the impacts of migration since remittance receiving households are most probably 
securing this benefit from the absent parent. The results suggest that only for young 
girls receiving remittances make a positive difference when one of the parents is 
missing. For other samples of children from households with an absent parent, receiving 
remittances is not associated with a significant change in the probability of attending 
school. 
 Columns 5 to 8 estimate the impacts of remittances for children living in 
households where both parents are present. Using this specification in order to estimate 
the impacts of remittances is crucial since the estimated impacts of remittances would 
be purged from the impacts of migration. As expected, the results suggest that young 
girls and old girls from recipient households are more likely to attend school compared 
to young girls and old girls from non-recipient households. This result is consistent with 
the view that remittances increase family income and allow households to invest more 
in schooling. The coefficient estimates of remittances for boys are positive but 
insignificant. It is evident from the results that households with absent parents benefit 
less from remittances in increasing the probability of children’s school attendance 
compared to non-migrant households. 
  
8.2. Child Illiteracy 
 Child illiteracy is an important indicator of national well-being. As known, 
developed countries have child illiteracy rates very close to zero. Therefore, 
investigating ways to improve child illiteracy rates is crucial to sustain development. 
Table 7 presents marginal effects of remittances on child illiteracy status. The 
dependent variable is whether a boy or a girl between ages 6 and 14 is illiterate. The 
results suggest that, on average, boys from recipient households are less likely to be 
illiterate compared to boys from non-recipient households. Receiving remittances 
decreases the chances of boys being illiterate by 3.4% from a base likelihood of 6.7%. 
This is in line with the view that remittances by relaxing household resource constraints 
allow parents to invest more in their children’s schooling. However, there are no 
significant advantages for girls from recipient households. This result may seem to 
contradict with one of our previous results which states that remittances increase the 
likelihood of school attendance of young girls. However, in order to estimate the 
impacts of remittances on school attendance of young girls one looks at whether a 6 to 
14 years old girl is currently enrolled to school or not. Similarly, to estimate the impacts
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of remittances on illiteracy status of young girls one looks at whether a 6 to 14 years old 
girl can read and write. Young girls from recipient households may have dropped out of 
VARIABLES Girls Boys
HH Receive Remittances -0.00947 -0.0345***
(0.0211) (0.0123)
Low educated parent -0.0443*** -0.0149
(0.0123) (0.0113)
Medium educated parent -0.0279*** 0.000186
(0.0101) (0.0124)
High educated parent -0.0281*** 0.00183
(0.0107) (0.0147)
HH head age between 30 and 50 -0.126*** -0.143***
(0.0223) (0.0225)
HH head age over 50 -0.0691*** -0.0753***
(0.00540) (0.00415)
Female HH Head -0.0299*** -0.00849
(0.00840) (0.0100)
Married HH Head 0.00757 0.0164
(0.0183) (0.0150)
Disabled 0.356*** 0.365***
(0.0440) (0.0388)
Rural -0.00586 -0.00818
(0.00608) (0.00583)
Number of children under 6 0.00891** -0.00550
(0.00362) (0.00400)
Number of children under 19 -0.000484 0.00189
(0.00373) (0.00405)
HH Size 0.00193 0.00300
(0.00313) (0.00328)
Year 2008 -0.00999 -0.00191
(0.00633) (0.00642)
Year 2009 -0.0183*** -0.0116*
(0.00612) (0.00617)
Year 2010 -0.0112* -0.00950
(0.00632) (0.00629)
Observations 11,431 11,585
Pseudo R-squared 0.0613 0.0622
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are in paranthesis. Infrastructural controls are included but not reported. HH assets included: 
number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine,
microwave oven, washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
Table 7: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Child Illiteracy
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school at some point in their education lives but at the same time may have learned how 
to read and write. Receiving remittances by relaxing household budget constraints may 
have allowed families to send their young girls back to school. So, remittances increase 
the chances of young girls attending school but do not have a positive impact on literacy 
status of young girls because they already are literate. Since the focus is on two 
different aspects of investment in child human capital, it is possible to end up with such 
seemingly contradicting results whereas the results do not contradict each other. Girls 
with educated parents are less likely to be illiterate compared to girls with parents 
having no education. Living in a female headed household benefits girls in reducing the 
probability of being illiterate. 
 In order to obtain estimates of remittances purged from impacts of migration, we 
use the specification which separates households into two; households with one of the 
parents being absent, and households with both parents being at home. Table 8 presents 
marginal effects of remittances estimated separately for these samples.  
 Children from remittance receiving migrant households do not seem to differ with 
respect to the probability of being illiterate from children from households where one of 
the parents is absent. However, children from non-migrant households are more likely 
to be literate if households receive remittances. The results may suggest why, on 
average, there are no advantages for girls from recipient households. Girls from 
recipient households may suffer more from the negative impacts of migration, or there 
may be unobserved determinants of illiteracy which are correlated with remittance 
receiving status that biases the estimates.  
 
8.3. Educational Expenditure 
 In this section, the impacts of remittances on households’ educational expenditure 
decisions are examined. The investigated educational expenditures of households are 
on: primary school, secondary school, and all levels of schooling (from primary school 
to university, and on uncategorized levels such as computer training, swimming lessons, 
etc.). The sample is restricted to households in which there is at least one primary 
school age child for the specification where the impacts of remittances on households’ 
primary school expenditure decisions are investigated. Households including at least 
one secondary school age child constitute the sample for the specification where the 
impacts of remittances on households’ secondary school expenditure decisions are 
investigated. Lastly, there is no sample restriction for the specification where the 
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impacts of remittances on households’ all levels of schooling expenditure decisions are 
investigated. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the amount of corresponding 
educational expenditure. Households which did not spend in the last month on the 
corresponding education level are identified as having a log expenditure value of zero. 
Household level variation is used in order to estimate the impacts of remittances.   
 OLS estimates are presented in Table 9. The first column considers the impact of 
remittances on the amount of expenditure on primary school. The results suggest that 
recipient households do not spend more on primary school expenses compared to non-
recipient households. The second column presents estimates for the amount of 
expenditure on secondary school. Recipient households seem to spend significantly 
more on secondary school expenses compared to non-recipient households. These 
remittance receiving households spend 17.5% more than non-recipient households on 
secondary school expenses. The last column considers the impacts of remittances on all 
schooling levels in general. It is evident that recipient households spend 14.3% more on 
educational purposes compared to non-recipient households. Recipient households 
including at least one secondary school age child may spend on private tutoring which 
may not be possible in the absence of the income derived from abroad. This may be the 
explanation why recipient households spend more on secondary school expenditures 
compared to non-recipient households.  
 Table 10 investigates the impacts of remittances on educational expenditures for 
households with one parent being absent and for households where both parents are 
present at home.  
 The results suggest that households with a parent missing spend more on all kinds 
of educational expenses if they receive remittances. Recipient single parented 
households spend 40% more on all sorts of educational expenditures than non-recipient 
single parented households. There is no statistically significant difference in the amount 
of primary school and secondary school expenditures between recipient single parented 
households and non-recipient single parented households. 
 When it comes to households with both parents being present at home, recipient 
households do not differ in the amount of primary school, secondary school 
expenditures and in the amount of any kind of educational purpose expenditures from 
non-recipient households. This may be due to the fact that recipient both parented 
households prefer to spend the extra income derived from remittances on other 
investment activities as buying house or land. 
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Girls Boys Girls Boys
HH Receive Remittances 0.0584 -0.0201 -0.0366* -0.0444***
(0.0507) (0.0231) (0.0190) (0.0126)
Low educated parent -0.00762 0.0260 -0.0585*** -0.0255*
(0.0202) (0.0185) (0.0147) (0.0135)
Medium educated parent 0.0435 -0.0384 -0.0384*** -0.00802
(0.0460) (0.0325) (0.0103) (0.0130)
High educated parent 0.369** -0.0367*** -0.0101
(0.168) (0.0105) (0.0142)
HH head age between 30 and 50 -0.0480 -0.119** -0.137*** -0.145***
(0.0366) (0.0493) (0.0256) (0.0250)
HH head age over 50 -0.0157 -0.0501*** -0.0731*** -0.0762***
(0.0284) (0.0165) (0.00564) (0.00433)
Female HH Head 0.0385** -0.0930 -0.00451 -0.0127
(0.0185) (0.0623) (0.0228) (0.0196)
Married HH Head -0.00382 0.0390** -0.483
(0.0186) (0.0198) (0.317)
Disabled 0.457** 0.337* 0.352*** 0.365***
(0.187) (0.172) (0.0454) (0.0400)
Rural -0.0162 -0.0171 -0.00487 -0.00726
(0.0199) (0.0195) (0.00636) (0.00605)
Number of children under 6 0.0250** -0.0153 0.00783** -0.00498
(0.0114) (0.0154) (0.00379) (0.00412)
Number of children under 19 0.00260 0.0323** 0.000246 0.000665
(0.0123) (0.0139) (0.00396) (0.00422)
HH Size -0.000719 -0.0296** 0.00130 0.00415
(0.00993) (0.0135) (0.00335) (0.00339)
Year 2008 -0.00640 -0.0135 -0.00899 -0.00160
(0.0234) (0.0207) (0.00665) (0.00665)
Year 2009 0.000648 0.0160 -0.0200*** -0.0125*
(0.0220) (0.0252) (0.00635) (0.00638)
Year 2010 -0.00137 -0.0321 -0.0125* -0.00800
(0.0218) (0.0199) (0.00658) (0.00653)
Observations 714 711 10,660 10,803
Pseudo R-squared 0.132 0.159 0.0617 0.0617
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis. Infrastructural controls are included 
but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine,microwave oven, washing machine, 
central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summerhouse, land, and shop. Stata does not include variables in the estimation if they predict success or failure perfectly.
HH does not have Absent Parent
VARIABLES
Table 8: Child Illiteracy and Presence Status of Parents in the Household
HH has Absent Parent
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VARIABLES Primary School High School All levels of schooling
HH Receive Remittances 0.00488 0.175* 0.143**
(0.0760) (0.105) (0.0604)
Low educated parent -0.00376 0.0874*** 0.109***
(0.0262) (0.0273) (0.0263)
Medium educated parent 0.125*** 0.301*** 0.483***
(0.0395) (0.0491) (0.0375)
High educated parent 0.517*** 0.454*** 0.664***
(0.0599) (0.0735) (0.0468)
HH head age between 30 and 50 0.0579 0.323*** 0.230***
(0.0417) (0.0398) (0.0293)
HH head age over 50 -0.0247 0.209*** -0.0724**
(0.0470) (0.0426) (0.0325)
Female HH Head -0.0651* -0.0557 0.147***
(0.0379) (0.0472) (0.0327)
Married HH Head 0.0140 0.00133 0.0418
(0.0465) (0.0504) (0.0328)
Disabled 0.00571 -0.0209 -0.0925***
(0.0386) (0.0409) (0.0262)
Rural -0.0945*** -0.0589** -0.131***
(0.0228) (0.0297) (0.0213)
Number of children under 6 0.0597*** -0.105*** -0.518***
(0.0144) (0.0198) (0.0152)
Number of children under 19 0.00814 0.0829*** 0.210***
(0.0122) (0.0132) (0.0131)
HH Size -0.0138 -0.0217* 0.0405***
(0.00963) (0.0112) (0.0105)
Year 2008 0.0221 0.196*** 0.195***
(0.0255) (0.0349) (0.0245)
Year 2009 0.215*** 0.169*** 0.290***
(0.0265) (0.0331) (0.0238)
Year 2010 0.377*** 0.146*** 0.351***
(0.0289) (0.0326) (0.0244)
Observations 15,626 10,105 37,219
R-squared 0.159 0.083 0.216
Table 9: Educational Expenditures
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis.
Infrastructural controls are included but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home,
computer, camera, dishwashing machine, microwave oven, washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
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8.4. Child Labor 
 In many developing countries, child labor is viewed as a natural phenomenon. 
Working for wage and working as unpaid family worker constitute the types of child 
labor. Helping a household member or a relative in operating family business without 
the expectation of a monetary return is considered as unpaid family work. Child labor 
may be accompanied by schooling; however, children in labor force mostly drop out of 
school. Besides, the former case leaves children less time and energy available to spend 
on schooling. As a result, child labor disrupts the acquisition of human capital resulting 
in lower expected earnings levels for the child. It would be interesting to see whether 
remittances can help children stay out of work force. Table 11 presents marginal effects 
of remittances on the likelihood of children working for wage, working as unpaid 
family workers, and working for wage or as unpaid family workers in general. The 
dependent variable for each of the probit specifications is whether a girl or a boy 
between ages 15 and 19 works for wage or as unpaid family worker, whether a girl or a 
boy aged 15 to 19 works for wage, and whether a girl or a boy aged 15 to 19 works as 
unpaid family worker, respectively.  
 Receiving remittances is not associated with significant changes in the probability 
of children working. That is to say, in total, children from recipient households are not 
different from children from non-recipient households with respect to working status. In 
terms of work for wage, girls are less likely to work if they belong to recipient 
households. Receiving remittances is associated with 5% decrease in the likelihood of 
working for wage from a base likelihood of 7.4%. Boys from recipient households do 
not benefit from remittances in decreasing their chances of working for wage. The 
results for labor as unpaid family workers indicate that boys from recipient households 
are less likely to work compared to boys from non-recipient households. Other findings 
indicate that households with more educated parents depend less on their children’s 
labor, both for wage and nonwage. This is consistent with the idea that higher educated 
families are wealthier and do not need their children’s contribution to the household 
budget. In rural areas, children are less likely to work for wages and more likely to work 
as unpaid family workers. This is reasonable because there may be scarce employment 
opportunities for children to earn wage in rural areas compared to urban areas. In 
addition, a high proportion of families in rural areas may be engaged in agricultural 
activities and, thus, require children to help them in farm.  
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 Investigating the impacts of remittances on child labor separately for single 
parented households and households with both parents present at home may be 
interesting in order to capture the heterogeneity of impacts of remittances. The only 
significant result is concerning girls and boys from households where both parents are 
present at home. Girls seem to work less for wage if the household where both parents 
are present receive remittances. Boys from recipient households seem to benefit from 
remittances in decreasing the likelihood of working in unpaid family businesses if none 
of the parents is missing in the household. These results are in line with being 
unaffected from migration’s negative impacts such as being induced to substitute for the 
absent parent’s labor activities, boys and girls enjoy from remittances’ budget relaxing 
characteristic which diminishes the household’s dependency on child labor. 
 Examining working hours of children may provide further evidence on the impacts 
of remittances on child labor. Table 12 presents OLS estimates for the working hours of 
children. The dependent variable is the number of hours worked as wage earner or as 
unpaid family worker by children between ages 15 and 19 in the week before the survey 
has been conducted. The results indicate that girls from remittance receiving 
households, on average, work 3 hours less than observationally similar girls from non-
recipient households. This result is in line with girls from remittance receiving 
households being less likely to work for wage. The results for boys do not provide 
evidence for a significant impact of remittances on working hours. This is consistent 
with earlier results that remittances have no significant effects on boys’ labor in general. 
 For the specifications in which the households are categorized in accordance with 
the presence of parents, the estimated results show that girls from remittance receiving 
single parented households are working less hours in wage employment and in family 
businesses compared to observationally similar girls from non-recipient single parented 
households.   
 Besides being affected negatively but insignificantly from remittances on the 
probability of school attendance, we suspect that girls between ages 15 and 19 from 
single parented recipient households are more likely to be engaged in other activities 
such as doing housework, or taking care of young siblings instead of attending school or 
participating in labor force. This is not surprising, since due to having a migrant parent, 
the spouse may have substituted the responsibilities of the absent parent, and older girls 
in the household may be required to take care of the housework. However, there is no 
information in the data which may be used to justify this argument. 
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8.5. Poverty 
 To assess whether remittances reduce poverty, I use as dependent variables whether 
a family lives below poverty limit, and whether a family lives below hunger limit. A 
household below the hunger limit is unable to earn enough income to cover their food 
Girls Boys
HH Receive Remittances -2.948** 0.204
(1.440) (2.770)
Low educated parent -0.331 -0.711
(1.097) (1.485)
Medium educated parent -3.326*** -10.19***
(1.242) (1.696)
High educated parent -3.918*** -13.74***
(1.272) (1.746)
HH head age between 30 and 50 1.834 17.71***
(3.440) (2.499)
HH head age over 50 1.744 16.88***
(3.454) (2.541)
Female HH Head -0.955 -4.294***
(1.050) (1.588)
Married HH Head -0.546 -5.408***
(1.397) (2.050)
Disabled -2.894* -15.46***
(1.725) (1.227)
Rural 2.359*** 1.052
(0.664) (0.911)
Number of children under 6 0.462 0.672
(0.502) (0.769)
Number of children under 19 -0.433 0.325
(0.330) (0.442)
HH Size -0.347 -0.772**
(0.297) (0.380)
Year 2008 -0.288 2.417**
(0.685) (0.972)
Year 2009 0.143 1.877**
(0.673) (0.939)
Year 2010 -0.503 1.539*
(0.663) (0.911)
Observations 5,884 5,976
R-squared 0.051 0.085
Table 12: OLS Results for Working Hours in the Last Week
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis. 
Infrastructural controls are included but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home,
computer, camera, dishwashing machine, microwave oven, washing machine, central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
Working hours
VARIABLES
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1. Retrieved on May 25, 2012 from  
http://www.turkis.org.tr/source.cms.docs/turkis.org.tr.ce/docs/file/gidaharcama.pdf 
requirements satisfactorily, while a household below the poverty limit is unable to cover 
their needs regarding health, clothing, transportation, housing, and education, in 
addition to food. Poverty limits and hunger limits are calculated every month for a 
family consisting of 4 individuals by TÜRK-İŞ.1 Firstly, the OECD scale is used to 
calculate the adult equivalent size of the household used by TÜRK-İŞ in calculating 
poverty and hunger limits. Secondly, for years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010 mean values 
of hunger and poverty limits are calculated. Thirdly, by using the adult equivalent 
household size, per capita per month hunger and poverty limits are calculated. Lastly, 
since in our data family income is in yearly basis, yearly per capita poverty and hunger 
limits are calculated by simply multiplying per capita per month hunger and poverty 
limits by 12. Then, by comparing per capita family income calculated according to the 
OECD scale with yearly per capita poverty and hunger limits, we assess whether a 
family lives below the poverty limit or below the hunger limit. From hereafter, poverty 
limits, and hunger limits will be referred as poverty and extreme poverty, respectively. 
In the data, 77 percent of the households live in poverty, while around 16 percent live in 
extreme poverty. For each of the two groups, approximately 1.8 percent of the 
households receive remittances.   
 Table 13 shows that remittances play an important role in reducing the likelihood of 
households living in poverty, whereas the significant impact vanishes when it comes to 
extreme poverty. This might reflect the fact that migration is costly and households at 
very low income levels might not be able to afford the costs. In other words, only 
households with income above a given level might send migrants and enjoy the benefits 
of remittances.  
 Table 14 which examines the heterogeneity impacts of remittances adds some 
details to the previous results. Receiving remittances is associated with a decrease in the 
probability of living in poverty and extreme poverty if both parents are present at home. 
For those households, parents’ wage contribution resulting from labor force 
participation in the home country is supported with an extra income source, remittances. 
So, it is more likely for recipient households with both parents present at home to be 
above the poverty or extreme poverty line. Single parented households do not seem to 
benefit from remittances in reducing the likelihood of suffering from poverty. This 
result may be due to a positive correlation between remittances and unobserved 
negative income shocks to a household’s poverty status.   
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VARIABLES Poverty Extreme Poverty
HH Receive Remittances -0.0406** -0.00854
(0.0162) (0.00709)
Low educated parent -0.0984*** -0.0605***
(0.0103) (0.00538)
Medium educated parent -0.223*** -0.0647***
(0.0195) (0.00329)
High educated parent -0.458*** -0.0694***
(0.0230) (0.00284)
HH head age between 30 and 50 -0.0367*** -0.0105**
(0.00777) (0.00439)
HH head age over 50 -0.0161* -0.0153***
(0.00845) (0.00466)
Female HH Head -0.0119 0.0122**
(0.00796) (0.00495)
Married HH Head 0.0553*** 0.0202***
(0.00947) (0.00378)
Disabled 0.0359*** 0.0415***
(0.00681) (0.00584)
Rural 0.0221*** 0.0491***
(0.00513) (0.00357)
Number of children under 6 -0.00585 -0.00156
(0.00444) (0.00181)
Number of children under 19 0.0542*** 0.0323***
(0.00327) (0.00185)
HH Size 0.00486 -0.00571***
(0.00299) (0.00130)
Year 2008 0.0364*** 0.0220***
(0.00494) (0.00375)
Year 2009 0.0293*** 0.0170***
(0.00491) (0.00349)
Year 2010 0.0506*** 0.0210***
(0.00471) (0.00363)
Observations 37,219 37,219
Pseudo R-squared 0.371 0.367
equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine, microwave oven, washing machine, 
errors are in paranthesis. .Infrastructural controls are included but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult 
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summer house, land, and shop.
Table 13: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Poverty and Extreme Poverty
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For example, a parent by losing his job may decide to migrate and send remittances. In 
the meanwhile, the negative income shock will reduce the resources available for the 
household resulting in an increased probability of living in poverty. In this case, the 
increased probability of living in poverty will be attributed to receiving remittances 
whereas the true impact comes from the unobserved income shock. Failing to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity may be the reason why we observe insignificant impact of 
remittances for single parented households.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 In this paper, the relationship between remittances and child human capital 
accumulation outcomes as well as educational expenditures and poverty status of 
Poverty Extreme Poverty Poverty Extreme Poverty
HH Receive Remittances -0.0431 -0.00446 -0.0450** -0.0139*
(0.0291) (0.0134) (0.0204) (0.00816)
Low educated parent -0.0977*** -0.0400*** -0.0984*** -0.0820***
(0.0144) (0.00754) (0.0212) (0.00815)
Medium educated parent -0.288*** -0.0527*** -0.215*** -0.0724***
(0.0338) (0.00770) (0.0391) (0.00397)
High educated parent -0.561*** -0.0745*** -0.444*** -0.0726***
(0.0383) (0.00686) (0.0462) (0.00321)
HH head age between 30 and 50 -0.00237 0.00348 -0.0509*** -0.0113**
(0.0198) (0.0127) (0.00868) (0.00479)
HH head age over 50 -0.0287 -0.0197 -0.0263*** -0.0137***
(0.0202) (0.0135) (0.00987) (0.00504)
Female HH Head 0.0325** 0.00629 -0.0571** 0.0450***
(0.0137) (0.00739) (0.0228) (0.0166)
Married HH Head -0.00844 0.0181** 0.00555
(0.0144) (0.00899) (0.0427)
Disabled 0.0151 0.0283*** 0.0427*** 0.0469***
(0.0141) (0.0100) (0.00790) (0.00721)
Rural 0.0566*** 0.0657*** 0.0152*** 0.0469***
(0.0126) (0.00982) (0.00559) (0.00383)
Number of children under 6 -0.0123 0.00280 -0.00701 -0.00105
(0.0228) (0.00618) (0.00449) (0.00190)
Number of children under 19 0.0812*** 0.0338*** 0.0521*** 0.0317***
(0.00991) (0.00485) (0.00351) (0.00200)
HH Size 0.0170** -0.00297 0.00283 -0.00670***
(0.00682) (0.00333) (0.00329) (0.00143)
Year 2008 0.0470*** 0.0298** 0.0389*** 0.0211***
(0.0149) (0.0127) (0.00516) (0.00394)
Year 2009 0.0309** 0.0243** 0.0297*** 0.0148***
(0.0135) (0.00970) (0.00524) (0.00373)
Year 2010 0.0518*** 0.0165* 0.0508*** 0.0213***
(0.0128) (0.00958) (0.00503) (0.00392)
Observations 5,849 5,731 31,356 31,370
Pseudo R-squared 0.415 0.376 0.366 0.368
central heating unit, car, motorcycle, summerhouse, land, and shop. Stata does not include variables in the estimation if they predict success or failure perfectly.
Table 14: Poverty and Presence Status of Parents in the Household
VARIABLES
HH has Absent Parent HH does not have Absent Parent
Notes:  * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are in paranthesis. Infrastructural controls are included 
but not reported. HH assets included: number of rooms per adult equivalent, ownership of home, second home, computer, camera, dishwashing machine,microwave oven, washing machine, 
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households is examined. In theory, the impact of remittances on child human capital 
accumulation outcomes is ambiguous. Receiving remittances is associated with sending 
a household member abroad to work, most likely the father or the mother. This results 
in reduced parental input into education acquisition, and higher responsibilities of 
children in maintaining the family. In addition, the absence of the migrant parent 
disrupts the family structure. All these have negative impacts on investment in the 
human capital of children. On the other hand, remittances relax household budget 
constraints and allow households to invest more in child human capital. Estimates of 
remittance impacts will not be purged from the impacts of migration. Luckily, the data 
lets us to differentiate households with respect to the presence status of parents in the 
household which allows us to investigate the impacts of remittances purged from the 
impacts of migration, since for households where both parents are present at home 
receiving remittances is not associated with current migration.    
 The main findings show that 6-14 years old girls from recipient households are 
more likely to attend school and 6-14 years old boys from recipient households are less 
likely to be illiterate. Concerning child labor, 15-19 years old girls from recipient 
households are less likely to work for wage and 15-19 years old boys from recipient 
households are less likely to work as unpaid family workers. Concerning working 
hours, 15-19 years old girls from recipient households work 3 hours less than 
observationally similar girls from non-recipient households.  
 Considering household level outcomes, households receiving remittances spend 
more on high school expenditures and on any kind of educational purposes. For 
households, receiving remittances is also associated with a decrease in the probability of 
living in poverty. These results suggest that 6-14 years old girls and 6-14 years old boys 
benefit from remittances in increasing acquisition of human capital. Remittances 
improve standards of living of households by moving them above the poverty line. 
 When it comes to heterogeneity of impacts of remittances, 6-14 years old girls 
from recipient single parented households, and girls regardless of age from recipient 
households where both parents are present, are more likely to attend school. 6-14 years 
old girls and 6-14 years old boys from recipient households with both parents being 
present are more likely to be literate. 15-19 years old girls and boys from recipient 
households where both parents are present are less likely to work as wage earners and as 
unpaid family workers, respectively. Recipient households with both parents present are 
less likely to be in poverty or in extreme poverty. Recipient single parented households 
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spend more on primary school, on secondary school and on any sort of educational 
expenditure. The results suggest that for 15-19 years old girls from households where 
both parents are present, remittances provide increased human capital accumulation 
both in increased school attendance and in decreased wage labor. The significant 
differences in estimates of remittances for single parented households and for 
households with both parents present at home indicate two important characteristics of 
remittances. Firstly, finding of an insignificant effect for single parented households but 
significant impacts for those with both parents present show the strength of migration’s 
negative impacts on neutralizing the positive impacts of remittances. Secondly, the 
results present evidence that remittances act like extra income which is clear from 
effects of migration and mimic the impacts of family income on outcomes of interest for 
households where both parents are present at home.  
 There are two concerns about the consistency of the estimates. First, selection on 
observables may bias the coefficient estimates. To overcome this problem, a substantial 
number of controls are implemented in the analysis. Second, failing to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity may bias the coefficient estimates. Some studies in the 
literature use historical migration rates at province level as an instrument to address the 
endogeneity of remittances. However, in our data, it is not possible to observe the city 
in which surveyed households settled. Without this information, it is impossible to 
create the instrument. Studies by Hanson and Woddruff (2003) and Acosta (2006) show 
that unobserved heterogeneity causes downward bias in estimates of remittances for 
schooling. Acosta (2006) finds the impact of remittances biased towards zero on the 
probability of children working for wage. These results suggest that estimated positive 
impacts in this study are lower bounds of the true impacts.  
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